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Abstract
Financial  depth  has  been  widely  studied  for  its  relevance  and  role  in  the
development  process.  King  and  Levine  famously  purported  a  causal  relationship
between  the  financial  sector  and  economic  growth.  They  were  later  criticised for
describing what may be an indicator, or perhaps self-fulfilling financial process related
to development instead. This paper will show however that in Ghana's case at present,
finance, and banking in particular, indeed are pivotal to  sustaining what has been an
impressive recent growth trajectory. Building on trends of global economic problem
solving,  this  paper  will  look  to  Eastern  Europe's  wave  of  banking consolidation  to
argue that shrinking the sector will make it more competitive. Not only that, but the
way banks will need to compete will be through higher risk, especially in SMEs and in
facilitating other financial instruments. Overall this will open capital structure options
in the country up so firms have a greater range of financial choice, managers' agency is
increased,  and  companies  are  more  able  to  tailor  their  financial  situation
competitively.  This  is  supported  by  quantitative  analysis  of  how  capital  structure
diversity looks in a variety of countries and how this relates to the availability and
terms  of  credit  for  growing  firms.  Overall  a  combination  of  qualitative  process
management analysis, supported by original quantitative empirical evidence, will help
deduce policy objectives given Ghana's own political economy and its place relative to
international financial and economic agents and forces.
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Chapter I  - Introduction  
Banks  in Ghana,  like most capitalist economies, have the double character of
being  profit-seeking  businesses,  and  fulfilling  an  economic  requirement  via  their
Schumpeterian role in managing capital and its rational allocation. It is a characteristic
of this position that the one side of banks' agency supports the other – when banks
make profit they allocate capital and when they allocate capital well they make profit.
A corollary of this last statement however is that when banks fail in one role however
they are neglecting their other. This is the reality of the banking industry in Ghana and
the  reason  is  simply  that  there  are  too  many  banks. The  result  is  none  are
exceptionally profitable versus the others and thus none succeed in allocating capital
in ways that will benefit the wider Ghanaian economy. Globally, inert banks are not a
new phenomenon, and placed in international context, there is an investment-driven
rationale nationally and sectorally for banks to change strategies.
The  Ghanaian  banking  industry  is  not  entirely  to  blame.  they  are  acting
rationally  as no  actor can be expected to do as intentionally as a bank. They are not
capitalised sufficiently to take on more risk, such as investing in the small and medium
businesses the country's economic development needs for entrepreneurial energy and
competitive diversity. Since the banks are not losing money, and taking big risks might
mean  failure,  they  have  no  incentive  to  justify  those  risks.  In  a  word  they  are
undercapitalised; and exist  despite the lack of a  robust  consumer savings industry.
They cannot afford to take risks under these conditions and nobody – least of all other
banks – is forcing them to do so.
This  is  where  the  government's  agency  becomes  important.  If  banks'  are
characterised  by  financial  survival,  profit-seeking,  and  the  provision  of  economic
infrastructure,  government  are  then  charged  with  ensuring the  mechanics  of  the
banking industry are catalysing, rather than impeding  wider economic potential.  In a
modern economy this does not mean coersion, but rather appealing to one side of
banks' character to motivate the other. The government needs to create a situation
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where banks generate profit by allocating their capital, with oversight, in places it will
grow  as  quickly  as  the  Ghanaian  economy  has  shown  capable  of  accomodating,
including the risk inherent to investing in an emerging market – even a domestic one. 
The  reality  is  that  in developing  capitalist  economies  many  industries,  and
companies  within  eventually  successful  industries,  will  be  subject  to  creative
destruction.  This  is  a  repeating  feature  of  countries  as  their  stock  of  industrial
endeavours  diversifies,  specialises  and  refines  (King &  Levine,  1993;  Chaney,  2005;
Manova,  2008).  Banks  are  a  key  ingredient  in  supporting  this  normal  economic
development where governments are unable to and party politics are too competitive
to allow for permanent oligopolies that can incubate economic  ventures.  In Ghana
there is a lack of financing options like robust equity and bond markets, which means
banks are not pushed by the normal forces of competition within their own industry to
take  risks.  Without  the  safety  of  central  planning  and  long-term  strategy,  risk  is
necessary to spark the feverish entrepreneurialism required to innovate.  A banking
industry that cannot facilitate this is dead economic weight and holds firm-level actors
ransom  for  their  own  survival  (Bonin  &  Wachtel,  2003).  Creative  destruction  must
begin then within the banking industry, and bank finance must be submitted to the
pressures of an economy where firms can find financing in a variety of ways to fit their
needs
1.1 Banking in Africa and Ghana
According  to  a  2011  Gallup  poll  funded  by  the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates
foundation, thirty-one percent of  African adults polled had only used informal cash
payment  services  for  the  thirty  days  preceding  the  poll  (Kendall  &  Sonnenschein,
2011). To clarify, forty-one percent did not make payments while only twenty-two per
cent used electronic means. The African banking market is indeed underdeveloped to
its own detriment. In Ghana, the IMF estimates that 44 percent of adults have deposit
accounts, while PwC is less optimistic at 30 percent. The bitter-sweet reality is that this
is  fairly  impressive  either  way  by  African  standards  – well  above  the  twenty-five
percent continental average. 
Ghana’s deposit base is still below its strongest African competitors though and
more  importantly  is  insufficient  to  inject  the  necessary  liquidity  into  a  potentially
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dynamic economy. Expanding that base requires infrastructure growth. The Economist
points out that this is becoming easier as financial and telecommunications (among
other)  infrastructures consolidate  (cell  phone penetration is  now over 100 percent
according to the Economist), but nonetheless this is a large financial outlay. It might be
hard to justify that spending as well for some banks. The 2012 PwC Ghana Banking
survey  points  out  that  the  Ghana  Commercial  Bank  has  over  twice  as  many  (157)
branches as Ecobank which finished just .4 billion short of GCB’s 2.1 billion cedi deposit
growth that year.
There is  some domestic  precedent suggesting where  solutions  might  lie. In
2010, UT Bank consolidated with its Financial Services branch. The move allowed the
bank to offer better interest rates on savings. Another major financial player, Ecobank,
has increased the terms of its loans. In 2012 sixty-two percent had terms over one year
versus five percent in that category in 2010. At the same time their share of the loan
market increased by forty-five percent to become the number one loan credit provider.
This shows there is a market in Ghana, hungry for better credit options. Further proof
can be found in the last IFC-sponsored Enterprise survey in Ghana (2007); sixty-seven
percent of SMEs and fifty-three percent of large businesses said that access to finance
was a “major” or “very severe” obstacle to doing business for them. The win-win nature
of  Ecobank’s  move  for  creditors  and  the  bank  is  precisely  what  will  need  to  be
replicated elsewhere in the industry. 
The need for more dramatic change can be explained by look not at the banks,
or the macroeconomic situation, but in firm-level theory. Capital structure literature
has carried debate for decades now on the optimal way to fund business. The debate
has not been settled beyond the minds of individual managers who in more robust
economies have the options available to them to make a competitive company of their
design. The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) is growing, although like many developing
markets it has been doing so with great volatility until recently. 
This discourages both investors and potentially listing companies. Year-on-year,
market capitalisation growth in the last three years though has stabilised somewhat
though  and  this  is  good  news  moving  forward.  Furthermore the  GSE  has  recently
4 | Gregory Gillette Global Political Economy
brought in a 1000-point indexing base to make understanding prices easier. Listing on
the Ghanaian stock exchange allows companies a 22.5 percent rather than 25 percent
base  corporate  tax  rate  for  the  first  three  years  they  offer  equity  publicly.  An
important  part  of  capital  structure  theory  since  Modigliani-Miller’s  1958  thesis  is
driven  by  debates  around  “shielding”  corporations  from  paying  income  taxes.
Companies in Ghana can deduct interest payments on debt up to 50 percent of their
capital structure. Getting that much capital is already difficult enough however as is
issuing  equity  to  make up  50  percent  to  keep  that  ratio  in  check  to  ensure  their
interest payments are deductible. 
1.2 Problematique
A combination of a financing gap and too many players meeting it with the
same  short-term  debt  instruments  it  discouraging  business  ethic  and  preventing
leading sectors from emerging. If a company wanted to use debt to offset taxes they
would need to be continually re-applying for these loans leaving them in a situation of
continuous  financial  insecurity.  This  dissuades  other  investors  from  their  firm  and
creates a catch-22 situation where the long-term security needed to go forward with a
public  offering  is  difficult.  The  banking  sector  is  not  dynamic  enough  to  provide
financing in both situations of higher risk and reward, and in lower return situations.
Too many banks operate in a country that does not have the commercial deposit base
to support the extension of finance to areas of potential growth that are calling out
for it. A collective action problem has therefore developed amongst incumbent banks
who cannot and will not provide financing in order to fuel competition in the rest of
the Ghanaian economy. Stagnation has set in as the country outgrows microfinance,
while the capital structuring options available to firms as they grow are limited. This
allows  banks  to  resist  facilitating  capital  diversification  and  to  continue  to  offer
short-term high-interest loans.
In Africa, for various historical and sociological reasons, financing options have
come to be synonymous with aid, microfinance, or money that creditors do not expect
to get back. None of these are sustainable or able to provide the volume necessary to
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take a country of forty million, let alone the ECOWAS region or indeed the African
continent  forward.  Furthermore  these  are  young  countries  demographically.  The
dividends of shifts in development mentalities that occurred in the 80s and 90s mean
that the current and next generations are generally more educated, organised, healthy
and indeed plugged into the world than those previous. To be sure there is great room
for improvement still in these areas, but the greater amounts of human capital coming
on  board  will  need  to  be  complemented  by  financial  capital,  in  order  to  produce
tangible capital.  This is a source of both optimism and frustration for development
economics, and the Ghanaian economy.
There is an opportunity and a great deal of energy in Ghana, and financing is
one of the major barriers to shepherding it. The sector is fundamentally undynamic
and that affects the ability of entrepreneurs to be dynamic. The government provides
a great deal of protection to agriculture and especially cocoa which can easily obtain
permanent tax holidays. In order to foster development in the rest of the economy and
allow diversification to  take place within  industries  and  between  them,  companies
need to be able to manage finances in ways already available to much of the rest of
the world. This is because despite these concessions, agriculture is not proving the
motor some had hoped. Other areas of the economy will need liquidity injections -
from banks and financial product issues. Capital is spread too thin to be offered on a
long-term basis and without long-term financing companies are handicapped before
they set out. This means financial capital is being employed inefficiently, and there is a
basic capitalist explanation: there is no competition to make it operate better, largely
because there are not enough options. Infrastructure is increasingly in place to do so,
but the institutional structure of Ghanaian credit is not catching up quickly enough.
1.3 Thesis
An overabundance of non-competitive financing providers needs to be replaced
with more horizontal options in financing instruments. Firms need to be able to pursue
a  variety  of  capital  structure  options  including  easier  access  to  equity  and  bond
markets. They also need to be able to obtain longer-term financing in order to benefit
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from tax deferrals before they are able to become publicly listed. Not only is Ghana at
a critical stage in development where this is necessary, it has a unique opportunity to
benefit from institutional stability and relatively low corruption. This will allow Ghana
to extricate the means to support industrial growth from a laudable, but cumbersome
cyclical  political  process and to set a regional  example.  Ghana’s  economy needs to
streamline the banking sector to make the most of the limited deposit base available
and  to  remain  financially  stable.  On  the  other  hand  firms  need  ways  to  be  less
dependent on banking and this  means taking advantage of tax breaks available to
equity market listers and obtain financing more independently. These steps will help
create a modern economic infrastructure that will allow the economy to go through
product, export, firm, and industrial diversification. Consolidating the sector will allow
Ghanaian banks  to  seek  profits  in  loans  to  emerging  firms  and  sectors,  in  turn
increasing the competitiveness of banking and finance, pushing banks to compete for
SME clients by offering better terms and supporting longer-term strategies. It has the
potential  to  create  a  West  African  finance-led  development  model  by  centring
industrial competitiveness on the banking sector.
1.4 Argument
Ghana is well-positioned to benefit from a consolidation of its banking sector
and growth and increased access to equity and bond markets for firms. Currently this is
an  important  blockage  for  domestic  businesses. A  combination  of  creating  more
pronounced sector leaders in banking, directing larger flows with more oversight for
longer periods of time - while giving companies more options to secure their finances
would be a big step towards giving the newly middle-income economy the foundation
to be driven further by innovation. There is a successful precedent for this in Eastern
and  Southern  Europe  where  bank  consolidation  helped  new  regional  leaders  like
Poland, the Czech Republic, Croatia,  or Estonia emerge and take advantage of their
populations' economic ambition. All of these countries (and others in their region) over
the same period or shortly thereafter also gained more efficient stock markets and
saw significant growth in listed companies. Poland was also the biggest improver in
the IFC’s doing business survey with Serbia gaining significantly just this year. That is
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approximately  a  ten  year  time  period  from  hopelessly  mired  post-soviet  economy
status - to becoming important engines of growth in a stagnating Europe.
Ghana has been democratic for about the same amount of time but has not had
the geopolitical advantage of being a potential threat to Europe. For it's part, it has a
stock market that began operations in 1989 which is also when many Eastern European
exchanges came on board.  from 1991 to  2012 it  grew from thirteen to thirty-four
companies listed. Poland by contrast grew from nine to 844 companies listed during
the same period and Serbia from twenty-two companies in 1997 (first year with data
by the IBRD), to 1086 in 2012 after peaking at 1771 companies in 2007. 
There are plausible solutions  thought  that take advantage of  Ghana's stable
democracy  and  lack  of  ethnic  and  other  conflicts  to  catalyse  growth  similarly.
Additionally,  its  strong  position  in  the  ECOWAS  community  which  has  itself
demonstrated a commitment to stability in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, and harmonisation
of regional economic activity gives Ghana many advantages. Transparency in finance
and  government  are  strong  enough  that  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  Ghanaian
institutions are “too corrupt” to allow growth through financial processes. At the time
of Eastern European consolidations the formerly state-owned banks were noted as
quite corrupt with few checks and balances in loaning practises. Since this is already
less of an obstacle in Ghana the remaining steps do not require long term cultural
shifts, but rather practical structural ones.
Data explored in this  paper also finds that the Eastern European firms that
enacted banking consolidation, saw major increases in access to finance for  unlisted
firms,  while  neighbouring  central  Asian  countries  that  did  not,  and  continued  to
stagnate. On average, firms in Serbia were three times more likely to have financing in
2009  than  2002  and  over  twice  as  likely  in  Poland.  Ghanaian  businesses  currently
identify access to credit as an important problem, and furthermore are more aware of
it than Eastern Europeans were in 2002 (the first year of surveys there). Businesses in
the country as well as academics such as Joshua Abor are writing highlight constricting
capital structure options as a major impediment to company growth. 
Instrumentalising  the  banking  sector  by  fostering  competition  within  it,  is
natural evolution of  the strategies seen in Eastern Europe. In principle it would be a
Ghanaian contextualisation of what was a successful strategy  elsewhere, taken one
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step further with the express intention of directing credit downwards from the outset.
Previous experience  is  indicative of  how banking consolidation can increase banks’
ability to provide credit  or create alternative, usually equity-based, financing options
for firms.  This paper will show that  Eastern Europe, along with some Asian and Latin
American improved the availability of capital structure options, and gave the tools to
smaller  businesses  to  prosper. Developing  equity  markets  then is  a  driver  and  a
beneficiary of better loaning practises as well for several reasons. 
Firstly, it liberates firms from the one and only option of extortionary loans.
Second,  it  can  help  firms  overcome  the  volatility  of  financial  cycles  -  their  capital
year-on-year is not dependent on renewing loans from banks that may have lost part
of their  capital  base.  Thirdly  it  forces  firms to  have better  financial  management -
transparency, standardisation, and best-practises in bookkeeping are all hallmarks of
listed  firms  (otherwise  they  will  not  attract  major  investors).  Finally  it  facilitates
outside investment into Ghanaian firms.  This is the crux of the potential for banking
and and finance reform to work in Ghana.  Globally,  Ghana has an ideal  position to
attract finance if it begins to achieve firm-driven growth. At present,  investment in
Ghana is limited to a few specialised companies’ products, or indeed venture capital
firms which  more average  investors may know little about  and therefore hesitant to
invest  money  with.  Improving  equity  finance  will  allow  for  efficient,  electronic
investment via international market infrastructures to more companies meaning more
average investors, ETFs, other mutual fund and institutional investors can more easily
access a wider section of the Ghanaian economy.
In the 1997 IFC Emerging Markets Factbook this process was already described
as  desirable  to  foreign  investors.  Emerging  equity  markets  grow  and  become
increasingly attractive to foreign investors who can diversify portfolios there. After a
certain point of development new equity markets become “approved exchanges” for
New York and London pension and mutual funds allowing still greater capital to enter.
These rules apply to sovereign wealth funds as well although their approval process is
not uniform or transparent in all cases. While individually more volatile, on the whole
emerging equity markets have performed much better than developed markets over
the past decade or so. Ernst & Young reports that their growth between 1995 and
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2011 was threefold compared to the developed world’s doubling. Of course growth
rates  in  catching-up  countries  are  expected  to  be  larger  (Abramovitz,  1986).  Most
importantly though is that there is a demonstrated demand by foreign investors to be
able to access these markets, and equity markets provide some of the transparency
necessary  to  overcome  the  information  vacuum  that  usually  deters  international
investors in frontier markets like Ghana.
While this means that companies would not be beholden to banks in the same
way they are now, the arrangement would benefit  them nonetheless  as  increasing
deposits  from  growing  companies  would  allow  them  to  benefit  from  taking  still
greater  risks  on  other  locally  emerging  companies.  Furthermore,  expertise  in  the
banking industry would necessarily be concentrated along with capital - provided loan
amounts  and  periods  increased.  This  would  allow  Ghanaian  banks  to  invest  more
similarly to traditional investment banks such as Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan  (De
Long, 1991). Their investments would carry managerial dividends as banks should be
wont of them to do.  Maintaining the human capital to monitor requires a sufficient
financial  capital  investment.  Thus,  with  a greater  loan capacity,  loans  will  be more
efficient. Were monetary capital  is alotted more efficiently and in greater volumes,
and capital  structuring options  are more varied banks simply will have to offer loans
under more reasonable circumstances  while firm managers gain manoeuvrability  in
organising their companies’ finances.
1.5 Evidence
Evidence from the World Bank shows that versus many other countries at a
similar  stage  in  development,  Ghana’s  equity  and  bond  markets  are  woefully
underdeveloped.  The  IFC  Enterprise  Survey  shows  that  SMEs  and  smaller  unlisted
firms have indeed a harder time accessing finance.  Unlike in some now developing
Balkan countries for example, Ghanaian firms both do not have comparatively as much
loan financing, and still perceive access to financing as a major problem. The Emerging
Stock Markets Factbook produced by the IFC until 2003, then by S&P  recounts many
similar stories in recent development from a financial perspective. While other regions
found  solutions, Ghana  and  most  of  Africa  remained mired  by  either  financial  or
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political trouble. In Ghana, this is reinforced more presently by analyses by both PwC
and (Abor, 2008). Both discuss the potential in firms that have access to cheap labour
of an increasing quality, but still cannot muster capital to put the resources available
to them to use. 
ISI Emerging Markets shows evidence of capital structure among top firms in
developing countries. It is clear that especially given Ghanaian firms’ ability to deduct
equity floats from taxation for a period after listing, that they are not amply taking
advantage of various capital structure options. Largely this is because they do not have
floatation capital and cannot obtain the stability of longer-term loans that are needed
to reassure investors so that flotations will succeed.  This limits their access to funds
from investors who are looking to hedge or diversify portfolios  but not in sufficient
quantity to meet the IMF's 10 percent  threshold to qualify as  FDI.  Foreign investors
simply  do not  have the logistical  capacity  to  overcome the information barriers  to
investing in  unlisted African firms.  Being publicly  listed would change that  putting
Ghana's economic growth into a global narrative. 
There is evidence that financial intermediaries are acting irrationally in Ghana,
and that it  is  restraining business development.  Since banks do not need to be so
stingy with their loans, it is logical that there are factors such as an overabundance of
intermediaries that prevent them allocating it in larger quantities for longer periods of
time to riskier ventures, and providing greater oversight along with those investments.
The  evidence  from  banking,  businesses  environment,  and  capital  structuring  data
together help tell the story of why Ghana is anomalous. While other African countries
may be in a similar situation insofar as a lack of financing and stock markets go, those
that have better developed equity markets often have less stable political or judicial
situations.  Kenya,  Nigeria,  South  Africa,  and  Mauritius  all  rank  lower  in  contract
enforcement  while  the  first  three  have  serious  ethnic  or  political  issues  that  can
dissuade  investors.  These  firms  all  indeed  have  more  sophisticated  manufacturing
possibilities at present; more complex firms and stronger industrial complexes.
Ghana therefore is in something of a regional catching-up role. Among these
peers, Ghana's unique stability could be built upon with a more advanced financial and
banking  industry  though,  giving  it  a  comparative  advantage in  terms  of  attracting
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international finance. While its competitors may attract targeted finance, Ghana can
attract more general invest diversification, allowing it more liberty in redirecting that
credit internally. This would be hinged on Ghanaian banks proving effective managers
– something in turn likely only to happen if the dynamism of the sector is improved
through,  for  example,  a  series  of  mergers  and  acquisitions. The  particular
opportunities based on institutional security in Ghana make it the best candidate for a
development model that combines more financing options pushing banks to act more
favourably to economic development,  including a process consolidation,  and where
this would be leveraged by opening doors to other options for firms.
1.6 Data
Several data sources have been used in compiling qualitative and quantitative
data.  They  are  comprehensively  listed  in  this  paper's  bibliography  and  their
instrumentalisation  detailed  in  the  methodology.  Some  of  the  primary  measures
include macro-level data on equity market growth, available from The World Bank up
to 2012.  Another major source was the The International Finance Corporation who is
responsible for the aggregation of the Enterprise Survey which is done on a selection
of  countries  rotating  annually  since  2002.  This provides  information  on  national
business environments and barriers at the firm level. Their data is qualitative, such as
how much  of  an  obstacle  loans  are,  or  why  firms didn't  apply  for  one,  as  well  as
quantitative,  e.g.,  how many firms have a  loan and the average required collateral
value. ISI Emerging Markets  is a private analysis company which has information on
public companies in developing economies up to present. Capital structure was looked
at from this company but largely replaced after finding more complete information on
this  topic  in  the  Orbis  database  from Bureau  Van  Dijk,  also  available  to  present.
Complementary  data  for  contextual  purposes  will  be  used  from  the  IFC’s  doing
business survey and other statistical sources. As a general rule for this paper 2010 was
used as  a  reference year.  Mostly,  this  is  because it  provided a  confluence of  data
sources,  particularly  WBESs  from  2009  –  2011.  Statistical  data  on  banking
consolidation in Eastern Europe was taken from previous papers which are cited.
These  sources  are  able  to  tell  multiple  angles  of  what  credit  and  financial
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diversification processes looked like in other recently developing countries facing a
similarly  globalised financial  sector  to  Ghana.  It  also  sheds light  on how the same
collective action problem Ghana is facing in its finance shortage can be dealt with.
More concretely, this paper will use a calculation of the variance in capital structuring
(debt-equity ratio) among publicly listed firms by country. This will be used as a proxy
for financial diversification. It will be shown that countries with more overall diversity
at the top levels of finance, also end up delivering better results for SMEs. As capital
structure can be employed in a huge variety of ways dependent on firm needs and
managerial  preferences,  it  is  a  key  element  in  corporate  strategies  in  competitive
markets. The variance of debt-equity ratios per country will also show that there is a
great deal more flexibility in the banking and finance markets of the Eastern European
countries whose experience with banking consolidation will be discussed.
Finally,  historical  information  on these  banking  histories  will  be  taken  from
various  newspaper sources from the era of consolidation  (1996-2004 generally),  as
well  as  retrospective  analyses.  This  will  be  presented  before  numerical  data  for
contextual  reasons.  The  historiographical  information  can  then  be  compared  with
quantitative information to create a results-oriented narrative based on the outcomes
identified  by  Ghanaian  businesses  and  authors  as necessary  for  the  country  to
maintain economic growth and foster a more robust economy. 
1.7 Summary and outline
By  comparing  data  on  stock  market  growth,  access  to  credit  in  recent
development  blocks,  and  proxies  for  the  ability  of  financing  sources  to  meet  the
demands  of  business  to  historiographical  trends,  this  paper  will  demonstrate  that
there is a strong complementarity in their mutual development, and an even stronger
case for this to happen in Ghana. Data on capital structuring will show that companies
are  taking  advantage  of  the  ability  to  manipulate  their  capital  structure  as  well.
Qualitative analyses  of  how banking reforms allowed greater  efficiency  in  banking
sectors will clarify the link between industrial development and banking sector reform.
Reference will be made to Ghana's situation at all junctures to be able to summarise
useful policy goals – without prejudicing policy itself.
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The following chapters will explain the theoretical and historical underpinnings
of the idea that equity market development and banking consolidation can liberate
capital flows and spark firm-led development in Ghana. The next chapter will provide
context of the Ghanaian circumstances at hand. The following chapter will,  through
literature review, elaborate on the theoretical underpinnings of the role of banking
and equity markets in development - in particular in their relationship to facilitating
credit  for  firm-level  innovation.  The  third  section  will  provide  a  brief  overview  of
capital structure literature with a focus on emerging markets so that that the reasons
the constraints experienced by Ghanaian firms can be understood in their magnitude
from  a  business  perspective.  The  fourth  section  will  overview  the  methodology
employed here. The next will present findings, followed by analysis and discussion and
the last chapter will conclude.
Chapter 2 -  Ghanaian Context  
Ghana is an ideal individual case country for an analysis of a currently-relevant
finance-led development strategy. it is growing and it's rate of growth is increasing.
This trend has been going on for some time and is reaching a point where observers
are  becoming  anxious  as  current  economic  institutions  are  likely  not  capable  of
carrying Ghana forward in its development. Its stock market has been growing but has
been volatile until recently when it began to stabilise.  Other positive signs are that
inflation is decreasing, infrastructure is growing, and interest rates are falling from
formerly unsustainable highs. This means that the characteristics of its economy now
are more and more likely to be influential in shaping the economy as it moves forward.
Still, Ghana faces serious challenges. The most visible is the lack of economic
sophistication  that  even  some  of  its  African  rivals  have  beaten  it  at.  Addressing
industrial  issues requires understanding the financial  mechanisms that  fund capital
allocation  however,  and  such  processes  are  impossible  in  Ghana.  Diversity  and
complexity cannot be created in its economy with a collective action problem severely
limiting entrepreneurial  access to finance.  It  is  a prescient moment to address this
however as other  Institutions (political, judicial, and social) in Ghana are at this point
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quite well-established, without being entrenched and problematic. Here the focus will
be on the political and economic fundamentals of the country to explain why finance
and banking are ripe for becoming the country's driver for economic growth.
2.1 Key Figures and statistics
Currently, financing is a major problem for Ghanaian firms. The last WBES there
was in 2007 and according to it the percentage of non-publicly-listed companies with
loans was 16.94% and the average collateral was 134.39% of the value of that loan.
Only a single firm out of 614 surveyed had used equity financing to purchase capital in
the year before the survey. Its stock market,  Africa's third largest, has failed to bring
more companies onto its index in any important quantity and despite a decent tax
structure firms cannot tailor their  capital  structure to their needs.  Ghana's average
public firm's debt-equity variance score was 1.23. Later it will be clear this is actually
impressively high.  It  is  misleadingly contradictory to the current hypothesis  in fact.
That number however is based only on fourteen firms for which the debt-equity ratio
was available,  five of which were themselves  banks.  One bank,  UT is  rather  highly
leveraged at a 4.4 debt-equity ratio and is mostly responsible for implying there is
flexibility  in  the  country's  financing  institutions  when  experience  based  the  WBES
suggests  there  is  not1. If  there  are  any  positive  takeaways  from  Ghana's  listed
corporate  data,  it  is  that  the  nine  non-bank  companies  represent  rather  diverse
industries – printing, publishing, consumer and electrical goods, produce, automotive,
pharmaceutical,  brewing, and of course oil  and cocoa23.  What institutional investors
and development economists alike should see in that list is on the one hand a situation
of market incumbency, but also of overall national economic potential. The problem is
the only industry that is not consolidated is the one that needs to be so that diversity
and competition can flourish in the others.
1 This fact, in addition to the most recent WBES in Ghana being quite old, are why Ghana itself will not be used in 
quantitative calculations.
2 Debt-equity information was not available to AngloGold Ashanti
3 This researcher was surprised that among Ghana's top listed firms were not any media companies or 
telecommunications companies. Indeed both may be listed and simply not have fallen into Orbis' triage (if deqbt 
equity information for 2010 was not available this would have happened), but readers should add those industries 
to the list as sectors Ghana has expertise in and which further diversify its overall economic potential. Obviously 
AngloGold Ashanti was triaged out as well.
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Ghana has other advantages that make a case for growth if financing is solved.
According to scholars such as Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996), the most important
reasons banks refrain from long-term debt is weakness in developing countries’ legal
systems  for  contract  enforcement.  Ghana  however  according  to  the  IFC  Doing
Business  survey  ranks  rather  well  -  forty-eight out  of  185  countries.  Enforcing
contracts  is  easier  in  Ghana  than  Croatia,  Poland,  Serbia,  and  even  Canada.
Furthermore the statistics indicate that average time for court proceedings is actually
less than the OECD average (487 versus 510) and vastly better than the Sub-Saharan
average of 649. The cost of pursuing a claim averages  twenty-three percent of the
claim value; only three percent higher than the OECD average and again much better
than the SSA average of 50.1 percent. Ghana’s overall ‘doing business’ score suffers
from extended periods for starting businesses and permit obtention, but since banks
giving  loans  would  be  most  concerned  with  being  able  to  recoup  losses  from
defaulting firms, the weak legal system argument is hard to apply to Ghana.
According  to  Abor,  the  situation  results  in  Ghanaian  firms  opting
disproportionately for internal financing (retained earnings).  Despite Ghana having a
strong stock market, there are serious barriers to entry to it. Firms cannot get the bulk
capital needed for initial public offerings for example. Foreign firms are able to do so
to raise funds locally for Ghanaian operations, and while this injection of capital into
the equity system is positive, it  means that Ghana's equity market is not providing
capital structuring diversity to the national economy's domestic firms. Agbloyor, Abor,
Komla,  Adjasi,  &  Yawson,  (2013) add  that  FDI  and  stock  market  development  are
mutually reinforcing processes. Were Ghana able to capitalise on the opportunities
available to its development process through its equity market, other vital sources of
finance like FDI  could be catalytically increased as well.
2.2 Politics and Ghana's place in global finance
Another  aspect  that  is  a  boon  rather  than  barrier  is  the  fact  that  Ghana's
political situation is one of the most stable in Africa.  That is to say, Ghana's democracy
is  well-established  and  not  facing  any  immediate  threats.  Yet  while  the  country's
democracy is stable,  It's two-party politics mean that  party-lead and government-led
development are unrealistic. In Ghana, politics are not a stable foundation upon which
to build other institutions. According Ghana's Institute for Democratic Governance, on
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the contrary, they are notoriously anathema to achieving institutional longevity – most
notably problematic in civil service staff replacements. While this is a challenge for the
country  to  overcome,  it  is  perhaps  and  opportunity  for  the  country's  economic
development as it takes the government firmly out of the business arena in any major
capacity. 
Ghanaian politics are fundamentally the reason that the mired banking system 
is so problematic for growth prospects. The Ghanaian political system is fundamentally
split into two parties, the National Democratic Convention and New Patriotic Party. 
These factions trace their roots to splits that predate the Ghanaian republic, gaining 
new faces and shifting throughout the country's history of relatively unturbulent 
military coups and democratic periods (Morrison, 2004).  While the democratic 
structures of the country are robust, the two-party, four-year electoral cycle makes 
politically-driven progress difficult.  
If Ghana's internal politics are currently one of its barriers to further economic
growth, its external situation is a major asset. West Africa is on the the most stable
regions  on the  African  continent.  Not  least  is  this  because of  the  commitment  of
ECOWAS, within which Ghana is a major player to maintaining political stability and
military security in the name of economic development. The active multi-lateral forum
has been a key player in quickly pacifying what could have become regional threats in
Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. Where other countries on the continent become mired in their
political situations (see: Zimbabwe), West Africa is effectively able to pool its military
resources  and send them.  Even if  outside (French)  help has  been necessary  in  the
actual crisis situations, the prevention of economically debilitating aftermath has been
unprecedented  in  the  continent's  history.  Add  to  that  the  currency  union  of  the
French-speaking West African countries, and the relatively un-problematic division of
coastal  oil  reserves  fuelling  regional  infrastructure  growth  (including  a  one
gigabit/second fiber-optic internet cable) and geopolitically Ghana is probably in the
best place in Africa to ride a future developmental wave. 
This  is  where,  from outside  the  sector,  the government  will  need to  create
improvement.  Accross Africa  FDI  is  an important  source of financing although it  is
rarely available in sufficient quantities. Agboloyor  et al,  details how  in Ghana FDI is
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needed, and has a strong positive relationship with stock market growth in the country
specifically  based  on  past  studies  using  quarterly  data.  He  stresses  that  Ghanaian
banks are unable to mobilise sufficient capital to compliment the financial sector and
facilitate its growth. Therefore the authors conclude that the shortcomings of Ghana's
banks – are holding back its ability to attract international investors  (Agbloyor et al.,
2013). Similarly, as business surveys show, Ghana, like many developing nations suffers
from  binding  constraints  from  finance  on  business  development  outside  of  public
equity markets as well. Availability of financing to small firms especially,  is the only
non bi-directional obstacle to firm growth being strongly correlated with sales growth
in firms in developing countries (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008). 
Financial and banking problems are more easily solved than the political, ethnic,
and social woes that threaten Ghana's continental rivals.  Ghana is quickly becoming
able to position itself strategically in an international investment climate. This is good
for  investors  and also  Ghana.  Because  of  its  political  character  and  the  utter
implausibility of government intervention in growth beyond nominal policy, FDI will be
needed to compliment growth,  but that is exactly the climate international investors
are attracted to – minimalist government intervention.  Boosting FDI means Ghana can
benefit  widely  from  its  foothold  in  diverse  industries  to  robustly  pursue different
economic avenues and trump endogenous-advantage focused theorists such as Justin
Lin(Stiglitz, 2011).  Lin, falsely universalised the idea that developing countries would
be  more  successful  focusing  on  endogenous  advantages  in  his  New  Structural
Economics Theory  (Lin, 2011). Nonetheless his focus on FDI to target advantageous
industries – however those industries are pushed - is plausible and as he points out is a
logical addition to neoclassical global economic theory.  One element of his analysis
remains relevant even if one does not admit the constraints on industry selection he
uses. Lin highlights the desire of foreign investors to hedge against economic setbacks
from banking or currency crises, and the fact that frontier markets, especially if access
to them were facilitated, would be an idea place for these funds to be directed.
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The importance of this innovation is that it does not totally reject neoclassical
theory  but  builds on it.  Neoclassical  theory  cannot practically  be rejected from an
international corporate finance and investor strategy point of view because it is simply
too pervasive in that industry. Ghana has a unique opportunity to inculcate this into a
development strategy though by using neoclassical portfolio-driven incentives.  Fig. 1
presents the increasing attractiveness of a growing and stabilising stock market to this
end.  Theoretically,  this  claim  rests  primarily  on  investor  tendencies  towards
diversification. Recent crises have pushed investors to go beyond developed markets,
while blue-chip companies have shown themselves  to hold value in some cases,  at
underwhelming  growth  rates,  or  to  indeed  have  been  deceptively  stable  and  fall
unexpectedly.
Fig 1: Easing volatility and overall growth in the Ghana Stock Exchange
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This is where the attraction of new investment horizons lies  as successive IFC
and S&P Emerging and World Stock Market Factbooks have pointed out. Ghana has not
only a potential  new-found market-cap stability,  but it also is an excellent portfolio
hedge at an index level4. The correlation matrices in  Figs. 2 and 3 demonstrate the
nearly  perfect  non-correlation  (figures  in  and  around  zero,  often  negatively  so)  of
Ghana's stock index to developed world prices.  This makes it  an ideal selection for
portfolio  diversity  at  an  index  level  although  it  does  imply  independent  market
research would be necessary.  This is where ETFs and other similar bundled products
which are more recent financial innovation at a commercial level are important. They
mean  that  investing  across  a  country,  or  region  is  relatively  more  easy  to  do;  an
average non-professional investor can purchase fund-style shares that follow an index
or  basket  like  he  would  an  individual  stock  and  avoid  paying  mutual-fund-level
management fees. Investors do not need to research a specific company therefore to
invest and they can research that EFT like they would any normal stock, yet have less
volatile movements as one would expect from a nation-level product. 
4 Emerging Stock Market Factbook until 2003 when the IFC gave production responsibility to S&P who changed the 
name to World Stock Market Factbook and restricted access.
Fig 2: S&P/IFCG Frontier Price Index Correlations (USD Dec 1995 - Dec 2000)
From S&P World Stock Markets Factbook
US S&P 500 1.00
UK FT100 0.59 1.00
Japan, Nikkei 0.42 0.42 1.00
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S&P/IFCG Asia 0.55 0.37 0.49 0.60 0.90 1.00
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This is where Ghana's political political stability is attractive. There is very little
threat of political unrest or ethnic tensions in Ghana  and without being a specialist
investor there is therefore nothing to spook funds out of the country. Elections are
peaceful  unlike  Nigera,  Christians  and  Muslims  are  relatively  non-confrontational
unlike Nigeria, and the various ethnic groups are far less tense than those in South
Africa which are its two main stock market rivals. Improvements in the stability of the
Ghanaian Stock Exchange further help attract FDI and other investments which would
not  be  large  enough  to  qualify  as  FDI,  but  still  flow  into  the  national  economy
regardless.
2.3 The interaction of banking and the overall economy in Ghana
The OECD's 2010 agriculture and poverty reduction study of Ghana, agriculture
cannot be ignored and will be necessary for continued poverty reduction (Diao, 2010).
Staple-product  agriculture  in  2010  made  up  twenty  percent  of  Ghana's  GDP.  The
report predicted that Ghana would move to middle-income status over the following
ten years. It ended up moving to the category later that same year. Moving forward,
many questions about the ability of agriculture to contribute to high-growth were and
will  continue  to  need  to  be  raised.  For  one,  the  sector's  growth  has  been  driven
primarily by land expansion – something obviously unsustainable and which is slow and
messy given the Chieftaincies' land claims and the devolved governance structure that
maintains their power in Ghana. That said, PwC  do offer that conservation efforts by
legislators  are  currently  slowing  this  trend. Finally  the  other  important  role  for
agriculture will be in moderating internal prices and evening wages gaps between the
Fig 3: S&P/IFCG Frontier Price Index Correlations (USD Dec 2002 - Dec 2007)
From S&P World Stock Markets Factbook
US S&P 500 1.00
UK FT100 0.74 1.00
Japan, Nikkei 225 0.38 0.31 1.00
Europe 0.37 0.51 0.50 1.00
Latin America 0.68 0.71 0.39 0.71 1.00
Asia 0.61 0.52 0.46 0.67 0.67 1.00
ME & Africa 0.32 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.39 1.00
Ghana -0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.16 -0.17 -0.07 -0.21
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North and South.
The PwC Ghana Banking survey from last year (2012) further iterates that there
might be issues with Agriculture as the main crux, and that somewhat contrary to what
the  OECD  had  said  two  years  earlier,  agriculture's  importance  in  the  Ghanaian
economy is declining (2012 Ghana Banking Survey, 2012). While mostly driven by proxy
benefits from the oil sector, industry has taken over as the second largest economic
sector in the country (after services). Oil is not the only driver however as increases in
road  and  other  physical  infrastructure  drove  a  twenty  percent  growth  in  the
construction sub-sector.  The IT  sub-sector  (of  services)  grew by seventeen percent
between 2011 and 12 while households grew 17.9 percent. Essentially, these are signs
of  the  further  diversification  of  the  Ghanaian  economy  as  the  country  is  slowly
becoming less dependent on gold and cocoa.
Understandably there are many with reservations and Ghana's potential should
not be overstated either. Robert Osei explained last year in a UN World Institute for
Development  Economics  Research  report  that  there  are  still  many sobering  facts
about the socio economic situation.  For  one,  Industry  may be growing,  but it  is  at
present  one percent  less  important  in the overall  economy than it  was  in 1980.  It
cannot be forgotten either that an alarming amount of Ghana's workforce is employed
in the informal  sector  –  as  much as  eighty  per  cent  (Osei-boateng & Ampratwum,
2011).  That said, Robert Osei reiterates a point repeated by Ghanaian politicians, that
the country  is  indeed one of  the few in  the world  on track  to  meet many of  the
Millennium Development Goals, including reducing extreme poverty by half. The social
dividend's future economic dividends should therefore not be overlooked.
Despite the large portion  of  the population  in  the informal  sector  who are
either untruthful or not counted in the IFC's WBES, only a woeful 6.42% of SMEs polled
in the year before the 2007 survey had loans or lines of credit. Without stimulating at
that level then Ghana's future risks being hijacked by  only a few industries  including
oil, greatly reducing its innovative capacity and threatening the country with issues of
inequality, environmental degradation, and social unrest that the sector's importance
brought along with it in Nigeria. Not only that but it is difficult to convince an informal
business to become formal if there are no dividends in the form of access to credit
once the business goes formal, to counterbalance the potential cost of taxes. 
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But Ghana's candidacy for analysis of an archetypal new development model is
not  because it  is  destined  to  replicate  Asian-style  growth  –  it  is  not.  Instead  it  is
because of a confluence of the other factors mentioned, chiefly the solvable nature of
its financing gap and the repeated importance of this problem.  Currently,  banks are
unwilling to lend to what they perceive as risky SMEs and new companies because they
feel it will make them uncompetitive. Meanwhile thirty percent of business according
to the WBES are not even applying for credit either because the processes are too
complex or they are unable to meet collateral requirements (fifteen percent for each
of these justifications). Only twenty-three percent of businesses applied for a loan at
all.  Since the drivers of financing choices are largely the same around the world, it is
only  a  matter  of  banks  being less  likely  to  meet the needs of  businesses  in  some
circumstances. Ghana is therefore in an excellent position to push industry forward by
removing some of the institutional barriers to unlisted firm financing, and supporting
company IPOs (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Pería, 2010; Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, &
Maksimovic, 2001; Quraeshi & Luqmani, 2011). 
2.4 Pro-business tax policies
Tax structure is in place for Ghanaian industry to develop. As mentioned there
is the three-year tax break for companies going public, a quite reasonable twenty-five
percent standard corporate tax rate5, and several other deductions available  (GTZ &
DANIDA, 2006). A few examples include differentiated tax rates based on region, with
the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions having a zero percent rate.  The tax
system is also used to incentivise financial institutions to aid in capital acquisition for
leasing and farming companies by reducing the tax on that income to twenty percent.
In addition to  this  and deductions standard in most  countries  (things like business
expenses, e.g. interest on loans), tax holidays are offered on tree, cash, and livestock
agriculture  capital,  and,  importantly  a  100% deduction  for  all  bank investments  in
venture capital companies.
Essentially, the tax structure is designed well to push growth, particularly since
5 The US is 35%
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the younger the business the less taxes they pay due to these and other tax holiday
programmes.  Tax policy is therefore something that international businesses should
find attractive should the country  stabilise and grow its  markets,  while  local  firms
should they get the financing to grow, will find is not an impediment.
2.5 Overview of banking in Ghana
The Bank of Ghana lists twenty-nine banks as operating with class 1 licenses in
Ghana. According to PwC the top five banks combine for a market share of forty seven
percent. For comparison's sake, Estonia, a country that went from having a thirteen
percent of GDP annual deficit and as much as thirty-seven percent of the population
keeping savings at home in 1998, went through a consolidation process whereby its
three largest banks accounted for ninety percent of market share (“Baltic States: Bank
Consolidation,” n.d.).  Lithuania's top two banks in 1999 had fifty percent of market
share, the top four banks in the Czech Republic account for 57.5 percent of share there
while four banks hold seventy percent of deposits in Sweden (Proskurovska, 2012).
This period of comparison is useful because it is right before their economies took off.
Ghana it seems has too many banks; a problem Anthony Akoto-Osei, former minister of
state  for  finance  and  economic  planning  highlighted  in  2011  when  he  cited  the
Canadian banking system which has only five principal banks  (for a comparably sized
population) (Quandzie, 2011)6.  The following year the Bank of Ghana approved three
more banks to operate (Citi FM, 2012).
The issue comes down to capitalisation. A large number of banks are unable to
capitalise themselves to take risks on up-and-coming businesses. This is coming at a
time when SME investment theory is shifting from small niche businesses being best
suited for that market, to larger banks with well-capitalised specialist branches (Beck
et al., 2010).  The industry should be interested in taking steps to capitalise on SMEs.
PwC points out that Baroda, an Indian subsidiary bank has been a very conservative
lender, taking on mostly government securities, but that it is the most profitable bank
in the country,  and has the best cost-income ratio, despite being the second smallest
bank  by  total  assets.  Due  to  their  corporate  heritage,  they  have  a  comparative
6 Although this is true it does not take into account the numerous social credit unions that are especially popular in 
British Columbia and Québec and share infrastructure to create the economies of scale that Dr. Akoto-Osei was 
pointing out Ghanaian banks are unable to foster.
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advantage  in  SME  lending  and  thus  are  expected  to  continue  to  build  on  their
successes with a lending strategy that seems to on a rather small scale emulate the
long-term  low-risk  plus  select  high-risk  investment  strategy  of  Sovereign  Wealth
Funds. 
Banks from 2011 to 2012 showed that there is little reason to believe that the
nature of Ghana's economy is not favourable to lending. The Doing Business data on
legal strictures is corroborated by the fact that many of Ghana's largest banks were
able to improve their loan portfolio performance in under a year through remediation
for  defaulting  customers,  increased  monitoring,  and  reducing  impairment  charges.
This while increasing total loan value by eighteen percent.  The strength of the legal
framework in Ghana and its relatively well-functioning institutions means that reform
in the sector could be carried out with a minimum of disturbance.
Chapter III -  Literature Review  & Theory  
The  past  twenty  years  have  seen  rapid  developments  and  a  theoretically
diverse body of work come about within development economics on the interaction of
finance, banking and economic growth. An important section of this has been lead by
the World Bank using findings from its business surveys which began in the 1990s. In
1993,  King & Levine, 1993 published a paper using panel data to asset a causal link
between financial depth, technical innovation, and economic development at a global
level over a period of thirty years from 1960 to 1989.  They followed this up in 1994
with a paper qualifying their findings with developing country-targeted research to say
that capital accumulation is part of the process of economic growth but not its cause
confirming an the the same assertion made in 1960 by Nicholas Kaldor,.  Much of this
non-self-distinguished  sub-group  of  authors  builds  on  the  economic  historical
traditions  established  by  Schumpeter and  Kaldor.  Technological  progress  is  a  key
objective and financial management is an important – though not solitary – means of
achieving it, and overall economic sophistication.
Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996) and Caprio &Demirgüç-Kunt (1997) would
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follow, conducting adding the dimension of firm limitations based on different sources
of finance and showing the importance of a country's legal environment in influencing
banks' decisions to lend.  Rajan & Zingales in 1998 then added specificity finding that
industrial sectors develop more rapidly in more robust financial environments. Perhaps
more importantly  though they  found empirical  evidence that  the largest  need for
funds in younger companies arises from the investment opportunities resulting from
technological shocks. Financial depth they claimed was key because of its crucial role
in supporting industrial innovation beyond what internal funds could do for smaller
firms.  The cost to firms they found of external financing, was, much like what firms
describe in Ghana, too high in country's where banks and markets were uncompetitive.
The result in Ghana seems consistent and is described by Osei:  firms follow pecking
order theory capital structuring and choose internal funds over external because there
is no advantage to external funds. Consequently, they are denied the opportunities
that larger liquidity would provide in technological investments slowing down sectoral
growth, theoretically most severely in industrial sectors.
One area of focus that this paper contributes to has been to try and identify
the mechanisms through which finance and banking affect firms in order to remove
obstacles to sectoral development. Levine and Zervos (1998) found that stock market
liquidity had a much stronger correlation with capital accumulation and productivity
than  stock  market  size.  This  paper  will  look  at  the  banking  side  and  the  overall
competitiveness of credit providers and if that is allowing businesses to meet more
specific  needs. Waheed  & Younus  (2010) looked  at M2  to GDP  –  as  a measure  of
financial depth  which they found improves steadily, alongside private credit to GDP.
FDI to GDP peaks at the high-middle income country group suggesting that domestic
economies are built by that stage to the point of being able to continue growth. They
suggest  that  international  conventions  along  with  supervision  are  key  to  ensuring
development  of  the  financial  sector.  Ghana  for  its  part  is  coming  to  the  end  of
streamlining official businesses' reporting procedures with listed companies and banks
pushed to IFRS in 2007, insurance companies in 2012, and all reporting entities by the
end of 2013  (IFRS adoption by country, 2009; Ramanna & Sletten, 2009). IFRS standards
provide network and therefore export benefits while being culturally neutral which
will be a good step forward institutionally for Ghanaian businesses.
Other large-N analyses were carried out,  largely by World Banks Economists
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showing that long term finance in particular is important to firm growth, identifying
finance  as  the  most  important  constraint  to  business  (more  than  legal  and  crime
indicators),  and  that  improving  access  to  credit  also  reduces  inequality  within
developing economies(Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005,
2008a, 2008b; Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996).  Ayyagari et al.  (2008), highlights
that  much of  this  body of  work  focuses  on marco-level  analysis  without  analysing
countries in depth. This paper therefore combines these and original empirical data
with a regional and several country cases in order to comment on Ghana's  specific
situation and prospects. 
3.1 Growth and developmental theory
This inquiry focuses on the reasons for non-competition in the banking sector
and why that creates barriers for Ghanaian businesses. This is an element of a still
wider body of global history history literature. It is an in-depth focus on on links in a
much bigger chain attempting to draw lessons from past development solutions to
find new ones and generate improved economic growth  in  Ghana and Africa  more
largely.  This section will  touch on government initiative/sectoral or cluster policy,
foreign direct investment, financial sector depth and development and perhaps most
importantly export diversification as a catalyst for stainable economic growth. 
This is not to downplay the role and importance of social factors. These will
be taken as similar to other endowments though, including natural and which may or
may  not  actually  lend  advantage  (Granovetter,  1983,  1985;  (Lin,  2011).  These
characteristics  are inherently  more  difficult  to  identify  than  natural  resources
endowments,  their  ability  to  trump  resources  proves  that  they  themselves  as
endowments  may  be  overcome by  specific  developmental  endeavours.  This  is
emphasised  by  Stiglitz  using the  example  of  Swiss  watches  to  imply  that  an
advantage can be generated without natural endowment,  and that endowment in
the social  sense can be engineered.  This  is  can be analysed managerially  from a
cluster  perspective  as  well  to  determine  policy-level  economic  manipulation
strategies  (Rocha, 2004). The idea generally is that a cluster, or industry could be
actively fostered within a particular national context, with an understanding of how
these  endogenously  developed  industrial  first  movers  came  to  be.  Surely  an
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understanding of the sociological composition of regions highlighted for potential
clusters or sectoral development must be important, but only inasmuch as it will be a
factor in the construction of the desired industry, not as a predeterministic factor
necessarily. This is important whether the sector chosen is to be predetermined, or
develop  organically  to  become  a  national  economic  champion  sector  as  in
Switzerland.  It  is  also an essential  foundation theoretically to understanding why
diversification  is  important,  as  a  root  of  specification,  in  a  developing  country
context.
Abstractly, the relationship between finance and development is not new nor
is it new in terms of the conjecture that finance in particular is an import prerequisite
industry  because of  its  inherent malleability  and therefore capacity  to  reactively
fund advantageous industrial  and institutionally reinforcing ventures.  The role of
banking and markets here will not be dissimilar to that explored within institutional
frameworks by  North & Weingast (1989). In arguing that the glorious revolution in
England led to the establishment of institutions facilitating trust  in the country's
banks  and  government  obligations,  North  and  Weingast  argued  that  the  British
financial  industry  was  able  to  expand  rapidly  through  the  new  credibility  that
debt-financing had. Subsequently the role of the financial  industry in funding the
industrial  revolution  is  a  historical  parallel  to  the  relationship  being  explored  in
Africa currently. 
There  is  support  to  this  in  a  modern  context  as  well;  ICT  infrastructure
facilitated  by  financial  depth,  although  capital  market  structure  does not  seem
important  given  the  high  international  interest  in  that  sector (Yartey,  2008).
Subsequently, as explained by Dennis & Shepherd (2011), expansion of infrastructure
technologies is a highly important factor in attracting investment and in diversifying
exports,  reinforcing  the  economic  agility  of  a  strong  financial  sector  and  its
developmental  potential.  Further  important  to  Yartey’s  findings  is  the  abstract
conclusion that financial development facilitates the development of a market for
knowledge-based products.  This establishes an important link to knowledge-driven
growth theory. Mokyr is a pioneer of the impacts of knowledge-capital on economic
development trajectories and their relationship to technological and human capital
28 | Gregory Gillette Global Political Economy
dividends (and therefore overall economic efficiency (Mokyr, 2002, 2005). Saint-paul
(1992) helps  bring  the  knowledge  economy's  impact  on  investment/financial
institutions full circle by stressing the impact of financial markets on technological
choice, on which knowledge-based human capital can either have a compounding or
negating effect, potentially made cyclical if those investments ultimately contribute
to redeveloping knowledge inputs per Yartey's theory with ICT infrastructure. 
Theoretically this could be visualised as the architecture with which a piece of
an economy can be built. Sectoral development literature is a relevant sub-discipline
of economic development because it allows for understanding more mechanically
why finance  and  banking  generate  self-perpetuating developmental  dividends.  It
also allows for compromise and therefore implementable and reasonable policy goal
development  as  neither  government  nor  the  private  sector  is assumed  to  act
effectively when independent of the other.  This is a key feature of looking at the
development of the banking sector itself, as in the Eastern European example used
here, notably by Bonin & Wachtel (2003) who detail the case study of new reforming
governments  interacting  with  a  reforming  finance  and  banking  sector  with
successful results. 
Other  authors  have presented  criticisms  against emphasising the  financial
sector's  importance  in  economic  development  agendas.  Hammouda,  Karingi,
Njuguna, & Jallab, (2010) find statistically no robust evidence that financial sector
deepening leads to  signs  of  development including export  diversification.  This  is
directly contradictory to the theoretical conjectures of King & Levine, 1993 and Rajan
and Zingales, 1998. Agosin, Alvarez, & Bravo-Ortega (2012) find that trade openness
can bring about industrial specialisation – a key outcome of economic diversification
– but  that  financial  depth  has  no  significant  impact  on  the  process.  Dollar,
Hallward-Driemeier, & Mengistae (2005) and Manova (2008) show on the other hand
though that financial sector development can indeed lead to export diversification
through increases in available liquidity (also Agosin et al. 2012). Manova in particular
demonstrates empirically that where borrowing is constrained  international trade
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flows are particularly limited. In turn, this perverts incentives to diversify production.
Dennis & Shepherd (2011) support this claim finding that limits to trade limit product
diversification,  or  conversely,  that  facilitating  trade  by  lowering  tariffs  leads  to
greater  diversification. Thus,  the  international  economy  plays  a  vital  role  in  a
market-led approach to business led growth in Ghana and it is clear that credit it still
more of a constraint halting several other mechanisms for economic growth in the
country.
This  international  context  is  vital  to  understanding  market-driven
development in a contemporary sense relevant to Ghana. If industry is to diversify, in
order  to  produce  competition,  and  then  selection  will  choose  winners  from  the
competitors based on their technological innovations and production advantages,
international business will compliment and accelerate these mechanisms. Whittaker,
Zhu, Sturgeon, Tsai, & Okita, (2008)  describe current economic growth strategies as
existing  in  a  world  of “compressed  development”.  They  argue  that  rather  than
submission to global market liberalism it instead means governments manage the
interaction  of  their  economies  and  these  forces.  Technological  upgrading  for
example  can  be  accelerated  by  participation  in  global  value  chains  where
governments are unable to ensure developmental-state-style upgrading. In turn this
can accelerate catching-up, but only if opportunities for learning to import economic
linkages are leveraged. 
How these value chains interact with local businesses, resources and how the
organisation and funding of chains occurs within borders is what the relationship of
finance to development can help explain and harness. If businesses are to upgrade,
increase complexity  of  production and move up value chains,  investing in capital
acquisition  and  opportunity  will  be  essential.  Political  barriers  are  the  primary
obstacle cited for successful compressed development by the authors, however in
Ghana banking seems to be much more of  a  challenge.  Finance,  argue King and
Levine (1993a; 1993b 1994), not only provides capital, (the means to obtain relevant
capital)  but  also  through  its  Schumpeterian  oversight  role,  provides  a  sort  of
pre-selection to filtering and selecting innovation and entrepreneurs before markets
do so increasing an emerging economy's success rate in producing winners – if banks
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have the capacity to do so. At the firm level, this is built into capital structure theory
whereby firms invest in profitable ventures, and profit is only assured by continued
market relevance through process or product innovation, which is why firms need to
be innovating not only their products but their financing streams, and banks need to
be  critically  evaluating  and  approving  these  where  there  is  viability  rather  than
declining because of their own undercapitalisation.
Whittaker  et.  Al  admit  the  risks  of  compressed  development  as  well:  if
companies  are  not  innovating,  value  chains  are  happy  to  have  static  nodes
internationally  as  long  as  they  are  providing  value  for  investment.  If  spillover
benefits are to be accrued from foreign investors into Ghanaian firm's place in these
production  infrastructure, innovation  will  need  to  be  geographically  located
alongside  that  investment.  If  innovation  is  driven  by  rent  seeking,  rents  may be
accrued within geographic specificity anywhere along a value chain. If the value chain
is controlled internationally, it is in the interest of its ultimate beneficiaries that the
efficiency  of  this  chain  be  increased,  and  if  the  costs  for  efficiency-producing
innovation  are  absorbed  locally  by  profit-seeking  behaviour  at  the  node-level.
Therefore, time series data show a robust correlation between financial, innovation,
and growth indicators, according to King & Levine.  They stress (1994) that it would
be shortsighted to assume that development rests as squarely on markets as some
theorists  in  the  1950’s  and  60’s  assumed,  and  thus  in  compressed  development
governments have a role in maintaining institutions to ensure commodity production
rather than relying on labour commoditisation.
Waheed & Younes (2010) build on this  institutionalist  angle  focusing on the
ability  of  more  robust  financial  and  banking  sectors  to lessen  transaction  and
information  costs.  This  is  why  above,  the  theoretical  frameworks  of  other
institutionalist  industrialisation  scholars  is  relevant  currently.  Transaction  cost
reduction incentivises foreign investment and makes local capital allocation more
efficient, thus bringing FDI and contracts.
Information  costs  fit  an  economic  historical  narrative  whereby  the
fundamental  problem  of  exchange  is  more  easily  overcome  through  formal  and
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informal  institutions  thereby  facilitating  trade  and  business.  Institutional
development,  the  role  of  government  in  the  model,  is  key  to  providing  these
transactional  dividends. Morrissey and  Udomkerdmongkol  2012  look  at  the
relationship between FDI and governance  and find that although more intangible,
the incentive and efficiency mechanisms of governance can be considered close to
institutional strength and non-direct exchange costs.  When these costs are higher,
they not only  deter  investment from within and without of  a country,  but make
markets less transparent and manageable to governments, increasing the  burden
catching-up.  Ghana's  governance though  is  largely  in  decent  shape  relatively.  As
pointed  out  by  the  Doing  Business  reports,  transaction  costs  are  not  overly
cumbersome there, and especially not in the areas where they would deter banks
from  lending  to  SMEs.  Thus,  Ghanaian  governments  is  not  a  major  obstacle
theoretically.
3.2 Markets and Banks
Efficient banking means that more funds are directed towards innovation and
production  rather  than  non-innovation-based  rents.  There  are  strong
complementarities  between  financial  market  development  and  FDI  in  Africa
(Agbloyor et al., 2013). Neither it seems can be discerned as chicken or egg, which is
logical  and not  problematic  in  a  policy  sense. Indeed a society without either  is
purely an abstractive exercise.  Efficient banking attracts funds and strong markets
allow for capital structure diversification.  Larger amounts of capital being brought
into economic systems increases sectoral competitiveness and growth. This second
relationship is hinged on capital openness, however as it is describing  a historical
series rather than theoretical conjectures, it can be taken to assume openness within
reasonability  as  has  been  practised  in  successful  examples  (and  indeed  is  not
extrapolated theoretically  or  from data to  a  consequential  point to comment on
policy).
Under  these  self-reinforcing  conditions,  diversification  can  take  hold,
theoretically  providing  sustainability  in  a  development  processes  via  competitive
innovation and opportunity at lower entry costs, while also limiting corporate rents.
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Stagnating developing economies however, often feature over-dependence on one
or  a  few  production  and  export  specialities. Their  economies  and  currencies
therefore become vulnerable to exogenous shocks from markets to natural forces
and often because of taxation structures and corruption it is difficult to diversify
from  this  position  and  ensure  economic  sustainability.  On  the  other  hand
over-diversification can be too much of a good thing. It runs the risk of spreading an
economy  thin,  preventing  the  necessary  concentration  of  resources  where
entrepreneurial  and  innovative  opportunity  exist,  and  can  mean  that  inefficient
industries or businesses are being propped up where divestment would serve all
interests  better.  Not  to  mention  it  would  mean  over-leveraged  banks  and  a
speculative market.
Strauss-kahn & Cadot (2011) address this problem and find statistically that
countries going through development processes largely over-diversify at a mid-point
where some industries hang-over before some are whittled away to more efficiently
distribute capital and labour. This does not depend entirely on natural endowments
although they will play a factor,  and often spark initial industries which countries
become overly dependent on. Before achieving a sustainable industrial turnover and
innovative capacity,  this  hump  will  mean  a  period  of  inefficiency  and  a  rather
overly-diverse export sector.  This gives the opportunity for industrial incubation of
key sectors and market forces that are not distorted by each other.
While investment is a necessary input in diversifying exports and production,
it also generates a TFP dividend increasing efficiency and attracting further FDI for
that reason according to Hammouda et al (2010).  TFP contribution to growth, they
note, is negative in many African economies and is part of the reason spillovers are
frequently  unobserved  in  FDI  and  value  chain  economics  in  Africa.   The  authors
demonstrate though, that TFP growth, spurred by export diversification, began to
show exactly such a catalytic effect on overall economic growth for African countries
in the early 1980s. African governments in the 70s had begun a series of projects to
become  less  dependent  on  primary  exports  and  endowed  advantage  industries.
These began to show fruits  by the  debt and SAPs  redirected African economies in
the 80s.  The effect being that a slight bump in TFP contribution to output again
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subsided leaving behind positive empirical evidence for diversification even if it was
not sustained.
 Klinger  &  Lederman,  (2011) look  at  quantifiable  outcomes  of  the  export
diversification hump occurring in countries as they develop. In the second phase,
specialisation, the number of export discoveries falls as the dividends of investment
in the process begin to bear fruits in the form of innovation  which are part and
parcel of the reduction in the number of firms – some showing themselves to be a
more efficient allocation of capital  than others. The authors found after industries
consolidated,  that  the number  of  patents  increases  dramatically  from  prior
developmental  stages. They find no robust connection  between this process and
factor endowments. Therefore transparent and effective capital allocation, shown to
increase  TFP  and  as  claimed  by  Lin,  freeing  up  capital  for  human  capital
development,  can make a strong case for  helping make African economies more
robust.
What it doesn't support still is actively seeking sectors with comparative 
advantage. Lin's theory seems at odds with the empirical realities of export 
diversification. But neither can the market be trusted alone to select only the best 
industries. Instead an internalised capitalist system, driven by local entrepreneurs and 
engaged financiers both internal and external seems to be the most efficient way to 
drive up the number of exports competing. This would allow for government 
stakeholder intervention through guidance of desired industries per Stiglitz argument 
for seeing potential more widely – but would not preclude markets championing 
profitable industries either, per Lin.  In a global context, the advantage of this is it 
allows relative political neutrality while maximising development options and plugging
into the condensed nature of modern global economics rather than resisting or pulling
away from it (Whittaker et al., 2008). It would mean that cluster-style development 
which has proven both effective and able to bear heavier environmental-social 
responsibility burdens earlier in a sectoral life-cycle, could co-exist with heavy-handed 
neoclassical global supply chains, providing two-front competition in terms of 
efficiency and returns, but also responsible strategies and corporate foresight (Marin, 
Navas-aleman, & Perez, 2009; Carlota Perez, 1985). 
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One  essential  theoretical  point  to  deal  with  is  whether  or  not  the  current
analysis is playing to the pitfalls of capital fundamentalism (King & Levine, 1993, 1994).
Simply put, this has to do with the idea that larger capital stocks and more investment
bring more future returns,  but that they are exogenous variables.  Of course some
investments  yield  higher  rates  of  return  than  others  which  is  where  capital
fundamentalism in a more modern context meets export diversification literature and
why politically, FDI becomes attractive in a compressed development situation (Agosin
et al., 2012; Dennis & Shepherd, 2011; Hammouda et al., 2010; Naudé & Rossouw, 2011;
Strauss-kahn  &  Cadot,  2011).  King  and  Levine  (1994)  explain  that  while  capital
fundamentalism fell out of vogue to technological focus, it has come back to the fore
in  more  contemporary  times.  As  globalisation  makes  technological  accumulation
easier, it in turn becomes more dependent on capital accumulation again. Still, capital
cannot be a single causal factor for economic growth, but the existence of institutions
for its delivery to locations that can facilitate innovation, is a key element. 
Capital  accumulation is  however in the Ghanaian context neither exogenous
nor to take precedent over technology or institutional improvement. Schumpeter and
Kaldor's analyses are not contradicted, the argument instead is that Ghana's growth is
primarily limited by a lack of availability of capital for producers to use as liquid input.
Instead,  it  is  being  argued  that  Ghana  has  a  high  enough  level  of institutional
development that the important factor of capital is needed in order to catalyse the
causal effects of its economic structure to produce growth. This is perfectly consistent
with traditional Schupeterian economics focusing on banking and markets as essential
means to produce technological progress and economic growth (King & Levine, 1993).
Neither  does  it  contradict  Kaldor's  1966  laws,  treating  financial  capital  as  an
exogenous  variable  necessary  to  set  off  a  growth  process  built  on  consolidating
Ghana's cheap labour in more productive sectors as exports and production diversify
and accelerate (Necmi, 1999). 
Thus Ghana's Ricardian collective action problem in banking is at the centre of
systemic  blockages  to  sectoral  development   (Schwartz,  2009). The  political
settlement in Ghana means that both parties and the government as an institution are
powerless to help overcome this problem. The government is not able to provide a
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Gerschenkronian-style  solution  by  injecting  capital  directly  and  parties  cannot
care-take industries because of partisanship. Instead, the Ghanaian solution will need
to innovate again on past developmental procedures  and substitute the factor of a
strong  centralised  political  actor.  Impulsed private  banks  (with  some  government
ownership  via  the  market)  to  this  end  present  an  appropriate  heir  to  past
developmental  blockage solutions  found in state banks  and government-facilitated
cartels.
The technological characteristics of modern production mean that reforms can
be implemented quickly and with more flexibility and accommodate a faster move to
more  diverse  production  via  the  medium  of  an  appropriately  incentivised  private
banking sector (Calota Perez, 1983). The consequence is that financing will would need
to be highly reactive and come from invested sources that have an interest in providing
monitoring – essential to investments in young firms in young economies. This is also
part of what makes the private finance sector – already in place in Ghana – a good
candidate to lead the way forward. The government for its part can provide impetus
for reform without the need to take up the full mantle of managing a shift to a more
efficient capitalistic structure. 
Ghana's government for some time has attempted to promote target sectors
(Osei and Quartey, 2005). Theoretically this is supported by numerous authors beyond
the traditional ISI framework one would expect to push such endeavours. In a more
modern context, sectoral development has grown as a field seeking a middle ground
between  capitalist  mechanisms  and  governmental  guidance  (Quraeshi  &  Luqmani,
2011).  Ghana attempted to use tax incentives not only to choose industries but to
decentralise  production.  The  issue  in  the  Ghanaian  context  is  firstly  that  the
government is hardly in a position to be able to “pick winners” and that the selection
of  a  champion  industry  is  fundamentally  at  odds  with  modern  developmental
processes  that  depend  on  competition  driven  industrial  selection  mechanisms
(Hammouda et al., 2010). The Financial sector is the best candidate then for taking that
role in Ghana since it  stands a better change of being competitively proactive;  and
more importantly,  efficient  in its  reactivity.  Hence its  crucial  role as  an exogenous
input for developing national growth.
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Chapter IV -  Finance and Capital Structure  
In empirical studies, corporate finance decisions have been related to factors as
varied  and subjective as firm ownership,  industry,  geographic location,  the type of
capital  used  in  the  firm,  and  even  the  gender  of  chief  executives.  Two  principal
theories developed in corporate finance theory  amount to  a preference for  taking
advantage  of  the  policy-driven  tax  environment  of  a  country  –  optimal  capital
structure theory; and a conservative aversion to debt and preference for the safest
credit sources, moving hierarchically towards riskier ones – pecking order theory. Both
have at heart the goal of optimising the value of the firm to drive share price up and
raise more capital for more investment and firm development at faster rates in more
efficient ways than competition.  Optimal capital structure,  in a sense, dominated the
field until modern corporate finance theory came about essentially because it seems
intuitive that there is an ideal mix of different financing firms, but that nobody could
figure it out universally or put a rule to it (Bierman Jr., 2003; Ghosh, 2008).
Jumping ahead,  both are relevant  to  the Ghanaian case essentially  because
firms  favour  pecking-order  strategies,  empirically  at  present.  Otimising  capital
structure is often not an option with first-loan-finance out of reach and equity market
access  difficult  until later  stages  of  business  development.  The  debate  in  Ghana
therefore cannot be contextually settled as one element is generally not a possibility.
More widely, the capital structure debate stems from a seminal 1958 article by Franco
Modigliani  and Merton Miller  who argued that  the value of a firm was completely
independent from its capital structure, basically saying that the arguments over capital
structure until then were moot (Modigliani & Miller, 1958)7.
Obviously  Modigliani-Miller  got  rebuffed,  although  they  themselves
acknowledged in the conclusion that their  analysis  was stylised and unrealistic  and
only meant to begin a debate on optimal capital structure with the goal of one day
“putting it on the shelf” as a solved question. The question was never solved. Ghosh in
summarising the history of capital  structure theory highlights that authors such as
Stiglitz and Altman were involved in the debate as early as 1969 and 1984 respectively
7 In an interview, Miller once said of the theory “you understand the M-M theorem if you know why this is a joke: the 
pizza delivery man comes to Yogi Berra after the game and says, 'Yogi, how do you want this pizza cut, into 
quarters or eights?' And Yogi says, 'Cut it in eight pieces. I'm feeling hungry tonight.'” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011).
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(Ghosh, 2008). Both authors detailed their versions of why debt puts shareholders at
risk of losing money in a corporate default and therefore lowers the value of the firm,
contradicting  M&M.  Before  them  however,  in  a  1963  correction  paper,
Modigliani-Miller made the famous conjecture that the cost of capital can be reduced
indefinitely and boost firm value using debt as the interest can be deducted from the
corporate taxes paid by the firm. Thus the debate about the ideal place between the
risk  and  benefits  from  different  mixes  of  debt  and  equity  was  begun  anew  in  a
different more technical and academic framework.
The  divergent  thread,  pecking-order  theory  (POT)  came  into  vogue  as  a
counter-proposal  to  trying  to  win  the  system.  Eventually,  system-based  arguments
were introduced on that side as well. Harold Bierman Jr. in 2003 while addressing the
limits of shareholder interest in firm survival and performance goes into how some
firms in  non-perfect  markets  (rather  than  the kind assumed by  M-M),  that  “for  an
ongoing profitable corporation it is difficult to do better than retained earnings (cash
flow from operations). There are transaction and tax advantages.” (p. 223, Bierman Jr.,
2003). The reality, authors suggested, was not a stylised leveraging to reduces taxes
but rather the more conservative and practical, 'pay down debt when there is surplus,
issue debt when there is deficit' (p. 10, Ghosh, 2008). 
The context  of  the  firm,  it  necessarily  follows,  is  highly  important  then  for
determining  how  a  firm  finally  will  decide  on  its  capital  structure,  especially  in  a
developing  country  context  as  there  are  greater  environmental  risks  to  hedge.  A
selection of factors that may influence this choice are interest rate, inflation, asset
tangibility,  industry,  competition,  geography,  other  financing  options  available  etc.
Factors  that  on  aggregate  have  shown  some  elements  of  predictability  in  capital
structure go so far as to include the gender of the primary executive; although Abor's
explanation  for  why  this  is  (a  gender  stereotype  of  risk  aversion)  could  warrant
scrutiny.  Bopkin,  another  Ghanaian  scholar  based  out  of  Legon  analysed  in  2009
several  determinants  of  capital  structure  using  seventeen-year  panel  data  from
thirty-four developing countries countries.  He found a negative relationship between
asset tangibility and leverage, and a positive relationship between interest rates and
the use of short-term debt. Short term debt therefore being preferred not to lock a
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company in  at  a  high interest  rate  that  may fall  (Bokpin,  2009).  He also found no
significant  correlation between financial  development and use of  long-term credit,
although  only  companies  that  already  had  equity  would  have  been  included.  The
current study looks at companies that do not have equity financing but may desire to
seek it  and  what  companies  that  do  have  equity  financing  can  tell  us  about  their
capacity to obtain it. 
Jaramillo  and  Schiantarelli  treat  the  history  of  restrictions  on  capital
structuring  in  Ecuador  and  how  the  country  has  evolved  since  (Jaramillo  &
Schiantarelli, 1996). In that context, restrictions, unlike in Ghana where they originate
in market distortions, were government imposed, during the 1980s. The government's
subsidised credit programme aimed to supplement the financing needs of firms, but
standard measures of financial depth revealed the inflexibility of the system. The M2
(money and quasi-money) to GDP for example was between twenty and seventeen
percent between 1976 and 1980. In Ghana, according to the World Bank, this ratio has
fluctuated at an only slightly better nineteen and twenty-six percent between 2006
and  2012,  although  it  has  been  on  a  steady  upwards  trend.  Their  analysis  finally
concludes  that  after  market  reforms  the  Ecuadorian  economy  improved  drastically
when firms were able to incorporate long-term financing into their capital structure,
resulting  in  overall  economic  growth.  Therefore,  while  the  source  of  financial
inflexibility  might be different,  its  impact was similar  and there is  every reason to
believe the results of its solution would be as well.
Ecuador's case was later  cited by Caprio & Demirgüç-Kunt (1997),  who looked
more widely at whether long-term debt was necessary in a development situation and
what role it played in that process. They found in survey data that long-term credit was
a primary obstacle identified by firms – as was found in WBESs that followed in later
years, analysed in this paper.  Indeed, similarly to the financial theories of an optimal
mix of financing at the firm level, the authors found that at the economy level that
there was an ideal mixture, circumstance depending, of long and short-term finance.
The former  allowing firms  to  plan  long-term,  prevent  liquidation,  and  make larger
investments;  the  latter  allowing  unprofitable  ventures  to  be  terminated  before
inflicting undue damage on a bank or an economy. 
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4.1 Financial reform and economies past and present
Stories of improvements in the financial  sector spilling over into banking an
reviving  economies  are  not  just  from  the  developing  world  and  such  longitudinal
analyses.  Michael  Moran  (1991) discusses  how a stagnating British  economy in the
1980's was able to do an about face with fairly simple modernisation measures in its
financial sector.  In essence,  London implemented restriction such as investing bodies
had  to  be  authorised,  but  devolved  the  authorisation  task  to  the  private  sector
(arms-length governance). As a result of fairly minor reforms, London arguably began
to overtake even its rivals in Tokyo and New York in global importance, after being a
financial afterthought for several decades. Another small lesson from Moran is that for
an economy to become an important banking hub – As Ghana might well in a West
African context – it is not necessary for the bulk of banks to be domestic. In London,
historically  the  lion's  share  of  banks  have  often  not  been  British,  originating  in
Germany in the pre-WWI era, and in the US and Japan in the more contemporary era in
which Moran was writing.  Small tweaks made from within the system, at the “meso”
level as Moran put it, can drastically change the system, potentially solving much of
Ghana's  collective  action  problem  by  reinvigorating  its  banking  competition  by
reducing the number of banks, and by offering firms more options – i.e. finding ways to
get more companies publicly listed. 
Regulation  cannot  be  ignored  and  there  is  by  no  means  a  case  for  total
liberalisation. The current thesis is one of putting finance and banking in the service of
the government's development endeavours;  something Ghana's politicians do seem
honestly committed to – but are unable to do so from within a bureaucratic structure.
East  Asia  provides  an  all  too  clear  tale  of  when  banks  totally  take the  helm  of
development.  Ibrahim  recites  quantitatively  the  qualitative  anecdote  of  Malaysian
development in the late 90s where banks were a key culprit of carrying the effects of
stock crashes to the real economy;  particularly since stock markets did not  show to
respond  in  reverse  fashion  abruptly  to  bank  loan  expansion,  weary  of  bubbles
(Ibrahim, 2006). 
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The  crux  of  the  matter  relevant  to  Ghana  currently  is  outlined  by
Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996). Analysing debt-equity ratios in thirty developed
and  developing  countries,  they  found  that  the  existence  of  active  stock  markets
increased the ability of thsoe firms to borrow, and especially in financial markets that
were  developing.  Where  more  capital  financing  options  in  the  form  of
better-developed  stock  markets  were  available,  firms  were  better  able  to  obtain
longer-term  loans.  While  there  are  purposes  for  short-term  loans,  the  increased
options meant that firms had more leverage over banks and therefore were better
positioned to choose at reasonable terms what they wanted. This paper uses a similar
measure  but  rather  than  measuring  the  borrowing  propensity  of  firms  via  their
debt-equity ratio, it looks instead at SMEs as a driver of growth and puts their access
to loans above that of more established firms.
Chapter V -  Banking consolidation in theory and practise  
Banking consolidation is a simple and viable way to mobilise a greater amount
of Ghana's  credit  and  overcome  the  collective  action  problem  of  its  banks.
Theoretically, were there to be fewer banks to split capital between, they would be
more  capitalised  to  meet  reserve  requirements,  have  lower  overhead,  lower
transaction  costs, and  therefore  be  more  able  to  seek  profitable  but  higher  risk
ventures  with  SMEs.  They  also  would  be  more  able  to  support  larger,  more
well-established businesses in going public  leading to a more robust stock market as
well.  Both make sense, and banks that carry companies through multiple stages of
development and provide oversight (as some in Ghana are starting to do), may develop
the  kind  of  relationships  that  historically  have  made  bank-industry  partnerships  a
successful model in the Germany and other bank-driven economies, as well as in the US
with its investment banks. 
There is a recent precedent for this manoeuvre as well. Eastern Europe, coming
out of the cold war looking to invigorate developmental processes realised by the late
90s when their own crises hit, that the number and style of banks operating in their
economies would hold them back. The uncompetitiveness stemmed from large, often
state-owned banks that were generally corrupt, incumbent, and undynamic. After the
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process, somewhat counter-intuitively, the larger banks were leaner, more adaptable,
and better positioned to support their countries' overall developmental processes. In
some cases it did not even necessarily require total privatisation (Poland's largest bank
is still state-owned). Now, many of these economies are the strongest in Europe and
are  to  an  extent  keeping  their  sluggish  Western  European  counter-parts  in  better
standing than they might otherwise be.  There were also surprisingly  high rates  of
non-depositing  to  add  to  the  validity  of  comparing  the  consumer  banking
backwardness to Ghana; although the Easter Europeans would have had more options
avoiding deposits more by choice. Nonetheless, Ghana is not in a situation where it has
to deal  with  nearly  as  much corruption,  government involvement or  manage large
privatisations in a potential banking reform. 
Bonin And Wachtel provide an overview of the process in the Eastern European
region. The developments happened simultaneously with significant improvements in
equity  facilties  as  well,  part  of  the  reason  the  move  was  so  catalytic  for  their
economies.  In  each  country  different  strategies  were  used.  Bonin  and  Wachtel
highlight  how  in  Hungary  for  example  foreign  owners  were  brought  in  to  quickly
recapitalise faltering banks. The Czech Republic opted rather to offer Eurobonds. Still
other  countries  like Estonia simply let  some banks fail  while Hungary recapitalised
them  with  foreign  funds,  providing guidance for  many  towards  new ownership  (J.
Bonin & Wachtel, 2003). Estonia as previously mentioned was also the most aggressive
of the Baltic states in its consolidation process. This is because Estonia has no deposit
insurance system and banks were allowed to fail  (“Baltic States: Bank Consolidation,”
n.d.). Three banks ended up with ninety percent of the market share in what was a
rather extreme example of the consolidation process. It did however allow banks to
invest  in  massive  commercial  banking  infrastructure  expansions  and  convince  a
hesitant population to open savings accounts.  Because of the rapidity brought on by
its drastic measures, Estonia gained a first mover advantage on Latvia and Lithuania
becoming a regional banking hub (Vipotnik, 1998).
Anthony Akoto-Osei, previously mentioned, favours a similar strategy of letting
some  of Ghana's banks either fail or simply be taken over.  He furthermore suggests
the  process  be  stimulated the  by upping  reserve  requirements (Quandzie,  2011).
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Indeed, there are questions to  whether a 'wait and see approach could yield results
and so this  more proactive path might make more sense.  There are no reports  at
present of barriers to mergers, there simply are none taking place. That seems to be
Ghana's problem – stagnancy. Upping reserve requirements would force banks below
the requirement to either take drastic action to gain capital swiftly – probably through
risk-taking – or to merge with one another/larger patron banks. 
There are more in-depth explanations for why the outcome could be good for
Ghana. Take for example Poland where in a period of two years seven mergers and two
acquisitions took place (Havrylchyk, 2004). That brought the sector from eighty-three
to  seventy-one  banks.  Havrylchyk  notes  that  Poland,  with  its  European  accession
looming in 2004,  was in a  position where its  relatively  large and regionally  strong
banks would have a hard time competing within the EU with UK, German, and French
banks. While Ghana is not facing the prospect of integration into a major regional area,
it is already a leader in one, and banking pre-eminence is something that is not only
within possibility for its banks, but could also be a catalyst for development in other
countries nearby.  Indeed, two more of Ghana's major problems were the same as in
Poland, where they were directly addressed by the mergers. 
Firstly, a lack of service infrastructure. While  many expected the mergers to
reduce  personnel in  the  banks  (they  could  be  managed  more efficiently),  some of
Poland’s moves lead to more personnel overall. At first this seems discouraging and
contradictory  to  earlier  claims,  however  it  appears  to  be  more  of  a
two-birds-one-stone  situation.  In  Poland,  Havrylchyk  explains,  the  back-office
personnel  were  reduced  and  rationalised,  while  front  office  personnel  grew
significantly as the newly enlarged bank sought to compete with other growing banks,
using its new heft to boost infrastructure investment significantly with more branches.
PwC points out Ghanaian banks are currently competing on this front making such a
move a prudent one there. Secondly, as far as domestic investment was concerned,
large listed Polish companies essentially were sufficiently capitalised and not seeking
refinancing. The consolidation process meant that banks were able to compete on the
new ground of a growing retail market and in emerging SMEs – an excellent  parallel
for Ghana. 
Even if foreign banks become a large player in a future Ghanaian consolidation,
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emperical and historical evidence suggests this might be good for Ghanaian SMEs and
the larger economy. Clarke, Cull, Soledad, & Peria, (2001) found, based on WBES (1999)
data that a  one percent  increase in foreign bank penetration meant a .27 percent
increase in bank lending to SMEs. Interestingly, it was not because the foreign banks
themselves were lending to SMEs, their propensity to do so was lower than domestic
banks. Instead it appears to have pushed, through a competition mechanism, domestic
banks  to  seek  opportunity  in  less  mainstream  companies.  Therefore  the  Hungary
strategy  of  targeting  foreign  banks  to  buy  up  stagnant  local  ones  might  prove
effective.  Baroda would likely  be a  winner as  it  would have a  head start  on other
smaller banks moving into SME financing. 
Bonin and Wachtel highlight five key economic roles for banks as institutions.
These  are  mobilising  savings,  investing,  determining  prices  on  risk  and  assets,
monitoring firms, and transferring ownership.  They also highlight another important
evolution in modern transition economies; the old dichotomy of bank vs. market lead
economies is essentially obsolete. Universal banks are leading the way in transition
economies  offering combined  services  as  Gerschenkronian  theory  highlights  in  the
pre-WWI  German  banks  while  competitive  markets  also  develop  in  almost  every
emerging country (J. Bonin & Wachtel, 2003; Fohlin, 2007).
The cyclical nature of Ghana's “permanent campaign” and tendency of incoming
parties to reverse the policies of previous governments can itself be helped through
banking  consolidation  –  something  that  would  be  difficult  to  undo  once  done.
Specifically, banks as vehicles for lending are therefore vehicles for the transmission of
monetary and other financial policies in developing countries. Larger banks that offer
longer loans at more stable interest rates however dampen these effects and interest
rate  changes  are  more  moderate  between  bank  product  rates  than  official
government  rates (Olivero,  Li,  &  Jeon,  2011).  One reason  cited  for  this  finding  by
Olivero,  Li,  and  Jeon  was  that  in  a  more  consolidated  sector,  banks  tend  to  be
“healthier”, in that their reserves are less likely to be seriously impacted by changes in
the terms they deal with central banks and each-other. Smaller banks will be forced to
pass on changes more abruptly. This suggest further that a rapid change in monetary
policy could be a relatively easy way to provoke consolidation in the sector resulting in
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more  consumer  protection  from  government  policy  and  more  diversity  in  banking
products.
5.1 Monitoring and oversight
Oversight and monitoring activities are two of the primary ways banks can add
value to loans. Historically-speaking this has resulted in more assurance of the bank's
funds on its part, and expertise and perhaps a stock boost on the part of businesses.
De Long (1991) explains that firms in which J.P. Morgan's bank invested in the late
nineteenth early twentieth century,  experienced a dividend in their stock price if a
Morgan agent took a  place on their  board of directors.  On the other  hand,  Crédit
Mobilier, a French investment bank operating between 1852 and 1870, was notorious
for having dumped credit into various real estate ventures without proper monitoring
or  consulting  (Paulet,  1999).  While  the  bank  would  be  influential  on  investment
banking in Europe, it would go bankrupt twice after non-returning loans. Their model
would  be  improved  upon  as  the  growing  European  economies  benefited  from
investment banks the learned to oversee investments and ensure the stability of firms
they were associated with through more than continued capital increases. In theory,
this strategy is easier for larger banks who can afford to sponsor oversight agents or
provide monitoring in a regularised fashion. Given that export diversification growth
theory  predicts  many  of  the  businesses  in  Ghana's  economy  will  fail  during  the
concentration phase of industrial development, it is very much in the banks' interests
to develop this capacity. 
5.2 Mechanics of consolidation
Bank  capacity  will  be  important  generally  in  their  ability  to  survive  and
contribute to a growing Ghanaian economy. This is why the idea of boosting reserve
requirements should hold some tractions. It is not without precedent either. Shortly
after  gaining  independence,  Estonia  increased  supervision  and  raised  capital
requirements, subsequently developing a strong banking sector that would be a model
for its region and play a role in their subsequent development processes  (Vipotnik,
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1998). The end goal is the mobilisation of the savings that banks have at their disposal.
Bokpin notes that as the banking industry in an emerging market develops firms may
well  begin  to  exhibit  a  preference  for  long-term  financing.  If  a  national  economy
stabilises this trend should be doubly apparent (as interest rates and inflation subside,
according to his statistically significant correlations) (Bokpin, 2009).
Crime,  political  instability,  and  finance are,  according to  Ayyagari  et  al.,  the
most important  obstacles to business growth. Relatively speaking, crime and political
instability  are  lesser  obstacles  in  Ghana  making  solving  the  financial  question
essential.  The  authors  suggested  that  in  solving  that  question  that  financial
constraints  on  businesses  should  be  lessened.  High  interest  rates,  high  collateral,
paperwork, the need for connections and unavailability of long-term loans were the
primary  vehicles  for  their  financing  variable  to  affect  firm  growth  in  WBES
cross-sectional data. These factors were all identified by businesses in Ghana without a
clear overall barrier. Therefore targeting the overall banking sector for reform makes
sense. 
5.3 Banking consolidation beyond Eastern Europe – not a regional anomaly
It can be difficult to overcome the idea that banking consolidation would not
lead  to  monopolistic  or  oligopolistic  behaviour.  The belief  that  many banks  would
create  competition  proved  wrong  in  Eastern  Europe  and  instead  many
undercapitalised  banks  resulted.  Economic  progress  took  off  in  the  years  after
significant consolidations. Bonin and Wachtel give data for most, showing for example
that Croatia went from sixty-one to forty-four banks in three years with a doubling of
foreign banks. The Czech republic went from fifty to forty.  Kazakhstan, cut its banks
from  204  to  forty-eight  between  1993  and  200  and  was  far  and  away  the  most
successful Central Asian country  as empirical results later show. Having many banks
offer homogeneous products is in the end problematic for consumers – businesses and
depositors  alike.  This  was  a  problem  as  identified  in  two  more  countries  worth
mention – Malaysia and Brazil. 
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Brazil's experience with banking consolidation also came in tandem with stock
market  reform.  In  their  case  however  it  meant  tightening regulations  on listing  in
order to strengthen the position of listed companies. While the number of companies
shrank market cap dipped slightly between 1998 and 2002 from 200 Bn. USD to 50 Bn.
but quickly began an upswing to its 2012 position of 1.2 trillion US.  A series of high
profile mergers  meant that the market share of the top three banks went from less
than forty  percent  in  1997 to  just  under  fifty  percent  with  the  rest  of  the  sector
consolidating mostly into the next six banks, and  a share over sixty percent by 2011
(World Bank;  Marray, 1997).  While no data are available before the 2009 IFC surveys,
that year's survey shows that 62.5 percent of Brazilian SME's had loan or line of credit
financing versus  Ghana's 15.5 percent  in 2007.  It is worth noting that in addition to
banking and equity market reforms, Brazil took major legal steps to help SMEs develop
and become an economic driver  in response to  a noted gap due to  high collateral
requirements, among other factors (Zambaldi, Aranha, Lopes, & Politi, 2011). Some of
these included simplifying the registration process for individual entrepreneurs giving
them access to social benefits including workers compensation and a 3.7 Bn USD fund
specifically intended for SME financing in 2009 (Ernst & Young, 2011). Without relying
on ODA or establishing a sovereign wealth fund it is unlikely the Ghanaian government
would be able to do the same,  making it  all  the more important that the banking
sector be restructured and pushed to bridge the financing gap in Ghana.
Malaysia like many emerging economies that have benefited from consolidation
provides  an  example of  a  government-driven  reform effort  (Majid  & Sufian,  2007).
Theoretically this makes for a fairly neat evolution in terms of government influence
for developmental purposes. In practise, it meant in Malaysia that the government saw
consolidating assets as a way to facilitate a speedy recovery after the 1997/98 crisis.
The government initially attempted to group the banks although when this didn't work
it  found  that  letting  the  banks  form  merger  groups  with  leader  institutions.  This
meant that thirty-nine finance companies and twenty-two domestic banks (banks with
fifty-seven percent of total assets), would be reduced to three finance companies and
ten  domestic  banks  with  71.5  percent  of  total  assets.  Foreign  banks  were  largely
untouched.  Banking  reforms  coincided  with  a  significant  growth  in  publicly  listed
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companies as well, - 529 in 1995 to 865 by 2002 and a similarly impressive growth in
market capitalisation according to World Bank data.  The move allowed Malaysia to
re-enter  international  markets  strongly  with  most  of  its  newly  consolidated  banks
having specialised in different market niches.  Importantly,  between 2000 and 2006,
Malaysia's central bank reports that SMEs grew from thirty to forty-five percent of
business loans (Omar, 2006). 
In summary,  a new banking sector  in Ghana might  look something like this:
fewer banks, larger foreign banks, more SME lending from domestic banks, slower and
lessened overall economic impact from monetary policy, higher capital requirements,
more infrastructure, stronger client-bank bonds, and more companies being helped to
public listing.  In particular, the last of these will be crucial in the analysis undertaken
here.  Not  only  would  higher  requirements  consolidate  the  sector  but  having
“stress-test”  requirements  might  help  Ghana avoid  a  situation  like  both Brazil  and
Malaysia saw in their respective crises. While generally speaking, countries with fewer
banks  have  a  precedent  for  being  more  competitive,  competing  forms  of  finance
should further increase the pressure on banks to find niches, take risks, and push new
firms to grow for higher returns. The following chapter will describe the methodology
for looking at whether or not better equity markets are successful in compelling banks
to lend to  up-and-coming businesses – as shown already,  a vital  component in any
future growth in Ghana. 
Chapter VI -  Methodology  
The methodology used will aim to make the case for banking consolidation and
capital structure option expansion, based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative
analysis.  Qualitative analysis  of the experience  of Eastern European countries  with
banking  consolidation  will  be used to  discuss  the  prospects  of  that  procedure  for
increasing the effectiveness of the sector as the main source of external financing for
SMEs (OECD, 2006). The Quantitative portion will use data from various databases on
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firm access to credit; credit as a barrier to growth; and capital structure diversity in
developing and developed countries.  The goal will be to show that more diversity in
financing at the upper end of an economy with large listed firms  can represent the
overall  lever of financial  flexibility of an economy, and therefore also deliver more
access  to  credit  for  up-and-coming firms  by  contributing to  increasing competition
within the banking sector. This will be to support the theoretical conjecture that as
firms have more sovereignty over their financing streams, banks must take risks on
smaller firms and generally be more flexible in their financing offers which will require
more dynamic loan programmes.
6.1 Methodology overview
The decision was  taken  to  comment  on Ghanaian  policy  using  outside  data
primarily in order to make a case for policy goals within Ghana. Problems have been
identified  by  Ghanaian  firms,  and  while  solutions  will  need  to  be  tailored  to  its
particular political and economic environment, the experiences of countries that have
recently gone through, or are failing to engage in the kinds of change Ghana would like
to  see  provide  valuable  lessons.  Thus,  sample  countries  centred  around  Eastern
Europe and Latin America, but these were backed up by developed countries and some
underdeveloped countries where data in both cases was available in aggregated form.
The only primary exclusions that had such data available are small,  generally island
countries  or  tax  havens whose  economies  were  deemed  incomparable  to  Ghana's
potential  developmental  trajectories.  Arab  oil  states  were  also  generally  avoided;
while Ghana's economy will be heavily impacted by oil, it is already far more diverse
and has much more potential for diversity than these states which tend to have fairly
particular economic indicators. Both exclusions are common in much of the previous
work  done on access  to  credit  in  developing countries  (Beck  et  al.,  2010;  Rajan  &
Zingales, 1998; Yartey, 2008; for example). 
The use of the variables employed here in these combinations was not found in
previous  research,  and  was  chosen  to  determine policy  objectives  and  options  for
achieving them. The qualitative portion has been dealt with in the previous section and
will be referenced in the overall results section. Quantitative analysis identified some
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avenues for further qualitative investigation in order to specify examples relevant to
instrumentalising the financial sector to maximise growth potential. The goal was not
to make a case for any particular sector or attempt to determine specific avenues of
fiscal consequence. Instead, without prejudicing Ghanaian policy, some clarity on what
a  roadmap  toward  the  kind  of  financial  infrastructure  that  can  ideally  incubate
competition-based growth processes such as industrial, sectoral, and export diversity
in order to attract FDI to non-oil sectors was sought, and found.
6.1 Indicators and data used
In  quantitative  analysis,  the  recurring  independent  variable  used  will  be
debt-equity ratio of all publicly listed companies for which aggregated data could be
found in a series of countries8. Since the debt-equity ratio is a reflection of the firm’s
capital structure, measuring the variance of this across an economy provides a good
idea of how flexible the financing situation in a country is for listed companies. It will
give an indication of how able banks and other financing options are to accommodate
varying managerial preferences for firm structure. Dependent on this, the percentage
of a sample of unlisted firms with access to credit will be measured. This will be taken
from different sources depending on region. A correlation between these variables, is
useful in making the case the more varied options for capital structure increases the
ability of unlisted firms to access credit, and thus increases the probability that more,
and more diverse firms will emerge in an economy, making it more dynamic and faster
growing.
Supplementary  analysis  will  look at  other  variables  as  proxies for  access  to
finance for businesses. These are: use of loan financing in capital purchases; whether
firms currently (at time of survey) have a loan; and whether firms that have applied for
loans have been turned down.
Rajan and Zingales (1998)  highlight that often when authors discuss financial
depth and economic growth, the usual proxy for financial depth is the overall size of a
country's primary stock exchanges, or the level of credit in the country. In this instance
8 While this was the independent variable, for visual reasons some of the charts below have swapped axes.
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the goal is to look at the links between those two, and focus then on their theoretical
and empirical  link with firm growth theory. Stock markets themselves are spuriously
related to growth as they may be exemplary of other factors (perhaps savings) that are
more likely to drive economic development. Savings in Ghana, while increasing, is likely
not growing yet at the speeds necessary for this alone to drive up lending in order to
fuel wider firm-driven growth. This is why other means of fuelling firms are looked at
here and an emphasis is being put on competing financing options as a way to pressure
capital providers to improve terms.
The first step in the analysis was to find data on access to credit for unlisted
firms in developing countries. This is available in the IFC’s World Business Environment
Survey in panel form for many developing countries, although to triage unlisted firms
it had to be extracted from microdata. Several indicators were selected  for analysis
including how much of a barrier businesses perceive financing to be; whether the firm
had used loan financing in the past year to purchase capital; and if the firm had at the
time of the survey a loan or line of credit. The latter measure was only available for
more recent survey and so not in panel form. Therefore the use of credit for capital
purchases  was used in  conjunction with  overall  stock market  data  (from the WBG)
while current  loan status was useful  for a  cross-sectional  (2010)  analysis  based on
firm-derived capital structuring data. 
Overall data on stock market size and capitalisation was taken from the World
Bank. Some countries were left out unfortunately due to a lack of data on the number
of companies and market capitalisation. The Tirana exchange is one notable example.
This is unfortunate due to significant growth in access to credit; six percent to 52.8
percent between 2002 and 2009. Meanwhile however, the perception of financing as
an obstacle has curiously grown from 1.02 to 1.36 as a weighted average out of four.
Capital  structuring  being  key  to  company  independence  and  capacity,  a
measure of this was needed.  ISI  is  a company that offers database information on
many firms in developing countries.  Their  data was originally  used for  establishing
capital  structure  measures.  However, specifically  on  firms’  debt-equity  ratio  this
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proved problematic.  Ratios were frequently far in excess of a functional debt-equity
ratio (one firm in Ukraine had a -40 000 ratio), and this was not simply a case of a few
outliers. Another database - Orbis - was  then used instead. Orbis has information on
nearly  every  listed  company  world  wide9.  Their  database  is  not  searchable  by
debt-equity ratio however which was originally why ISI was preferred. In Orbis it was
possible finally to calculate the individual debt-equity ratios for listed firms based on
long-term  debt  and  shareholder  funds.  After  doing  so, much  more  reasonable
numbers  were  returned.  This  study  employs  average  national variance  scores  in
debt-equity  ratios  as  a  proxy  for  financial market  flexibility  across  countries  in  a
development economics discourse.
To maintain consistency, 2010 was used as a benchmark year. This originally was
due to the fact that it was the most recent year with good data from ISI,  but also
because it was reliably complete from all other databases, and central to a 2009-2011
period where a large volume of WBESs were completed.  Within 2010 data in Orbis,
several  indicators were available to desribe company financials.  Shareholders funds
were  chosen over  total  shareholders  equity  as  the  former  was  available  for  more
companies and usually identical when both were available. Also, all liabilities Insurance
companies were excluded as equity data was not listed for  any of  them. As well, in
some cases  there were minor discrepancies  between Orbis  data and,  for  example,
stock exchange official data. Orbis returned 100 listed companies for Austria while the
Wiener Borse website listed only eighty-five and seventy-nine companies in Orbis had
data from 2012. This implies perhaps a mixture of new listings and delistings  which
might be carried over despite not currently offering shares, or differential access to
data on the part of Orbis which is difficult to account for.  Finally some companies,
while  publicly  listed  in  developed  countries,  did  not  have  data  in  Orbis.  These
differences  are  relatively  minor  and  deemed  not  to  impact  on  the  overall  data
significantly, particularly since the company data is not available so uniformly for every
country from any other individual source and it was preferable to have consistency in
database  methodology  than  to  mix  databases  or  indicators  for  obtaining
company-level information.
9 Although not necessary the same variable, but information is much more complete and believable than ISI. The 
divergence between the same measures in these databases is rather interesting as both are subscription-based 
investment industry-oriented products.
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Orbis does also have data on unlisted firms. For some countries this was more
companies than could be contained in a single excel spreadsheet. As well there was a
great deal of uncertainty regarding company information with many inconsistencies in
individual company indicators relating to debt and other financial questions. Thus only
IFC and ECB data  were used for determining loan access as it was consistent across
countries given the survey methodology employed in both cases and that no further
triaging  was  required. To  save  space  the  lists  of  companies  used  have  not  been
included,  although the methodology has been elaborated and manipulated data files
can be made available upon request. In total no less than 12,000 listed companies from
fifty-five countries  were  used  in  initial  calculations calculating  and  analysing  the
debt-equity  ratio  vs.  either  loan  access  or conditionality  which  included  several
thousand more unlisted companies. This number was reduced slightly after companies
with a 0 for debt-equity ratio were removed as it either implied a reporting error or
was not relevant as it meant a firm that had no debt.
For  European  countries,  ECB/EuroStat  data  was  used  from  the  April  –
September 2011 survey because it was the first survey to expand the sample size to
more than four countries  and still close enough to the 2010 base year used for IFC
WBES data and Orbis data. This survey identifies for each country whether or not firms
used debt financing. From Developing countries the data were taken from the closest
WBES to 2010 and the question of whether or not firms had a loan. These were chosen
as  the  most  absolute  measures  of  access  to  debt  financing.  Some  companies  or
countries  were excluded because of data problems. Azerbaijan for example had only
one listed company with no defined debt-equity ratio in Orbis' database.  Guatemala
and Burkina Faso  are two more countries with a lack of data. Some were excluded
where  companies  were  almost  exclusively  listed  abroad,  and  were  not  generally
domestic  businesses  (mostly  these  were  tax  havens  such  as  Belize  where  most
registered companies list in London)10. 
6.2 SMEs
A point of clarification regarding the definition of SMEs  is useful here. Under
10 An interesting study on tax evasion or export overpricing could probably be done based on this database.
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the WBES  SMEs  are classified as businesses with fewer than 100 employees. In past
surveys (Demiguc-Kunt etc.) this extended up to firms with 500 employees.  The ECB.
where other data were taken from, usually used a 250 person cap. The WBES attempts
to establish the number of employees at a firm at start-up, however this information is
often  not  present  and  so  custom  filtering  was  not  possible.  Nearly  all  companies
identify the bracket they fall into. As the focus of the study looks at both SMEs and
larger unlisted firms, this inability to distinguish between 100+ employee and 500+
employee firms mean that all have been used in the current analysis as the focus is
generally on the ability of non-listed firms to gain bank loans  or other financing in
countries with better-developed financial systems. 
Past studies have established that indeed larger companies (as with many other
variables) tend to obtain credit easier, however an overall measure was sought here
(Abor, 2008; Beck et al., 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2010; Jaramillo & Schiantarelli, 1996). In
many countries,  SMEs make up an enormous percentage of companies in any case;
over  ninety-nine  percent  for  countries  as  diverse  as  Chile,  Thailand,  Slovakia  and
Switzerland (OECD, 2012). Firms that are declared as publicly listed are excluded  for
this measure as they traditionally have few problems accessing bank finance and they
already  have  more  sovereignty  over  their  capital  structuring.  This  also  avoids
comparing  companies  to  themselves  inadvertently  as  even  the  listed  firms  are
anonymous in the WBES. Firms with more than 50% state ownership were also cut as it
is assumed the mechanics of their financing do not represent firms that would benefit
from  increased  financing  options  and  easier  access  to  banking  credit  as  in  the
Ghanaian situation. 
Furthermore, there are other data imperfections. There are many cases where a
firm  that  has  been  included  in  the  survey  multiple  years,  will  identify  using  loan
financing one year, but not provide data other years. In order to calculate the number
of firms receiving finance a combination of three measures were used. the first two
deal with financing used to obtain capital in the previous year (bank and government
loans  percentages  of  capital  financing).  This  is  available  in  all  years  in  most  cases
although some results  of tabulation feel unrepresentative. One example of this is in
the case of Bulgaria where these two measures suggest that 9 percent of firms in 2002
had loan financing, followed by 21 percent in 2005. Subsequently in 2007 this measure
suggests that no firms (of 781) had financing from loans, while two years later in 2009
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18 percent had financing again. After 2007, a question was introduced asking firms if
they “currently” had loan financing. when this was supplemented in, growth rates for
access  to  financing  seemed  more  plausible  and  indeed  optimistic  (controlling  for
overlap). In order to further qualify firm access to finance, the question, asked in all
years, of whether a firm had applied for a loan and been denied was also looked at.
While  it  has  been  shown  that  firms that  exist  longer  have easier  access  to
credit, controlling for this variable reduces the sample size significantly  within WBES
data. Additionally there is a great deal of variation and difficulty in establishing the
continuity  of  firms given that  often  in  Eastern  Europe they were privatised public
companies or a part thereof, or formalised informal companies  in regions like Africa
and Latin  America.  This  makes  is  very  difficult  to  establish  standards.  Additionally,
national context will cause variation in the importance of this variable. Finally while
many businesses claim a year of initial operation, the year of formal incorporation is
often left  blank.  Because of  these factors  all  firms that  are not  publicly  owned or
publicly listed were kept for analysis.
6.3 Analytical strategies
Different  methods of  comparison were used for  different  indicators.  Charts
were  produced  to  compare  trends  by  country  for  changes  in  stock  market
capitalisation and the number of companies using loan financing in the year preceding
a  survey.  These  indicators  were  taken  from  the  World  bank  and  the  IFC  WBESs
respectively. As the goal was to look  at changes over time it was impossible to use
more  robust  measures  of  loan  access  and  thus  no  numerical  comparisons  were
performed. Individual cases of interest can be found in these charts however and thus
they  lead  to  important  qualitative  areas  of  literature  review, as  with  Slovenia  for
example.  Based on what managed to contribute to specific qualitative changes on a
per-country basis, identified by this exercise, several policy recommendations can be
made where comparisons are relevant Ghana's potential developmental paths.
Next,  statistical  analysis  was  done  to  examine  if  other  variables  were
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correlated. OECD data was used to compare access to long-term loan financing among
SMEs to capital structure variance with a weak, non-significant correlation. The same
capital  structure  variance measure  was  run  against  Orbis data  sets  from  nineteen
countries that were both in the ISI  and WBES data.  This  returned a non-significant
correlation in the expected direction (countries identified in Appendix III). The data set
was then expanded to ISI developing countries and Europe,  to see if a trend existed
along  a  wider  continuum  of  incomes  from  twenty-nine  countries.  The  results,  as
shown,  in  the  following  section  were  encouraging  and strengthened  the expected
trend that  capital  structure  grew along with  access  to  debt  financing for  unlisted
firms.  Finally  for  further  robustness a  wider  range  of  stagnant,  higher-income
developing, and European countries were tested, forty countries in all, in order to have
countries  from a still  wider  array of  income levels,  regions, and national  economic
environments.
When  calculating  the  variance  in  a  country's  debt-equity  ratio,  outlier
companies were eliminated. This was defined by countries which had a debt equity
ratio over six  (already a very high ratio). It meant eliminating roughly two percent of
listed  companies  overall.  A  record  was  kept  of  all  companies  eliminated  and  is
available, although exempted from annex to save space. A good number of these were
investment  banks  which  do  tend  to  be  more  highly  leveraged,  as  well  as other
companies that may have unknown relationships with banks that allow them to be that
highly leveraged.  They may indeed in some cases be the result of corrupt practises
creating  exception  to  regulation  or  norm.  In  all  three  cases,  they  are  not
representative of the kinds of arrangements that characterise an economy or can be
expected by firms; and are generally quite anomalous.  The goal was to measure the
flexibility of finance markets within reason, rather than within the realm of possibility
of  oligarchical  relationships  or  other  extreme  circumstances.  When  they  were
included, national averages were skewed so that overall, countries ranked according to
the exception rather than the rule,  given that the vast majority of companies cannot
operate with debt several times their value11.
11 These charts not included although could be used in some cases to try and seek problematic sectors or places 
worth investigating for corporate corruption.
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Chapter VII -  Results &  Discussion  
The first analysis was done by comparing World Bank data on the growth of
number of companies listed on a country's stock market(s) and the use of credit. This
measure unlike whether firms had an active loan, was available for three years in many
countries and could be matched against  stock market  changes. Appendix I  contains
comparative  charts  for  changes  in  stock  market  capitalisation  and  use  of  loans  in
acquiring capital. This is not a perfect measure of access to capital as in most cases the
number who in the last year of the survey said they had a line of credit or loan was
usually higher than those reporting using loan credit for capital acquisition. Roughly
half of the countries  exhibit comparable trends in both categories. Plots for changes
in number of listed companies were not included as in many cases they did not bring
new information. That data is available in an included chart at the end of appendix I. 
While there is not a statistically significant trend, there are some interesting
stories that jump out. Firstly there is strong but not total consistency in covariation.
The country that perhaps most strongly bucks the predicted interaction with an almost
perfect negative interaction is Poland (Fig 4). In the Polish case the stock market grew
consistently between 2002 and 2009, and yet every ear the number of firms using loan
financing shrunk. There are a few possible explanations for this but one could be that
firms are finding finance in other places and banks are reluctant to move into the SME
sector. To that end, the number of firms listing in Poland over that period went from
216 to 248 to 359 (and 569 in 2010). There are not sufficient accounts of data on the
same  firms  in  Poland  changing  status  to  confirm  this  from  the  data  although  a
longitudinal study could in future focus on the conditions involved in specific firms
acquiring equity financing, especially in absence of access to debt. 
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Some evidence is present for this more optimistic outlook. Firstly, Polish firms
seem to be voluntarily avoiding debt financing because they do not need it. Of firms in
Poland who did not apply for loans in the year before the 2009 survey, 75% said they
had sufficient capital.  This would be consistent with standard pecking order capital
finance theory. It would be worth investigation to discover why Polish firms were able
to fund themselves, although it is likely predicated on exporting within the European
Union where Polish firms benefited from a unique disparity in buyer price standards
and  internally  low costs  of  living.  This  would  not  however  be  relevant  to  Ghana's
situation;  although  its  economy  may  increase  exports,  it  will  not  have  the  price
protections of the EU to boost profits and offset the need for loan financing.
Nonetheless  it  is  curious  that  in  2009 access  to  finance was  still  cited as  a
higher  concern  for  Polish  businesses  than  previous  years.  There  were  even
twenty-seven respondents  of those  who said  they had sufficient capital and did not
need a loan, who also identified access to finance as a major or very severe obstacle.
Furthermore in 2009 when the measure of firms with loan financing was added, 50%
claimed to have a loan or line of credit (still regionally low). As well, as the next section
will go into in more depth, Poland also had a high variance in capital structure among
listed  firms.  All  of  this  goes  to  suggest  that  more  financing  mechanisms  became
Fig 4: Polish SMEs, percent who have bought capital with debt in the past year and Polish
stock market capitalisation growth
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available  to  Polish  businesses  as  the  country  rose  to  prominence  in  the  European
economy and significantly restructured their finances.  Indeed while more firms with
equity and other financing forms does not preclude loans as well,  Poland may be a
case where businesses gained the ability to turn down unfavourable terms.
At first it may therefore seem there is little to be learned from the Polish case
for Ghana. However, Poland's transformation was lead by the strongest bank in the
country following the government's  policy  direction.  The majority  stock of Ghana's
largest bank, the Ghana Commercial Bank, is split between two government-related
bodies12. This at once put them at a buffer from partisan politics but also close enough
to government to take advantage of a directed shift in the country's financial sector.
This  could  incentivise GCB to  be  a  leader  in  the  process  without  needing  to  be a
traditional  state-owned  entity.  Having  a  public-policy  champion  in  the  sector  is
therefore a good takeaway for Ghana, and is a further plausible move for a bank that
according to  the PwC Ghana Banking Survey  is  not among the more innovative or
rapidly changing banks. GCB could therefore focus on pushing sectoral mergers rather
than itself seeking to increase its portfolio risk with SMEs.
At the other end of the spectrum of results, one country with an almost perfect
linear relationship is Slovenia (Fig 5). Like many of its neighbouring countries, Slovenia
went  through  aggressive  banking  consolidation  between  1998  and  2004.   Kosak
(2004), notes especially that the Slovenian banking sector was filled with incumbent
banks unwilling to reform, and that the onus fell in that country as well on what was a
relatively weak government  to trigger the process.  Thus the country may have some
sectoral best practices relevant to Ghana. The country went from forty-four banks in
1994  to  twenty-two  in  2002.  This  was  achieved  through  relatively  easy  regulatory
changes like upping reserve requirements, brining in international standards and did
not rely on international banks coming in. Instead, gradually a series of banking groups
formed  which  in  much  smaller  numbers  were  in  stronger  competition  with  one
another.  Foreign banks, notably France's Société Générale,  were just as likely to be
bought out by domestic companies as vice versa which should show that countries
12 The Social Security and National Insurance Trust, and the Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic planning. The 
former explains why the bank does not go beyond traditional banking services and maintains a low risk-profile, the
latter would be keep to see the bank remain stable, but change standard practise within the financial sector in a 
way that could not be ignored by competitors due to its size and commercial infrastructure.
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should not fear a takeover of their economy by utilising market forces moderately for
sectoral  restructuring.  Among  Eastern  European  transition  countries,  Slovenia
developed one of the most effective sectors with depth in finance, banking and other
facilities with the least foreign penetration (J. P. Bonin, 2004). Slovenia saw a marked
improvement in its ratio of banking assets to GDP, and is one of the  few countries
where firms saw finance as less of an obstacle to doing business over time as this
rating dropped from 1.21 to 0.79 – indicating a high degree of satisfaction13.
Fig 5: Fig 3: Slovene SMEs, percent who have bought capital with debt in the past year and
Slovene stock market capitalisation growth
For the most part the data showed businesses rather intuitive of changes in
loans in their countries at an aggregate level.  Kyrgyzstanis for instance  raised their
country's loan obstacle score from 1.21 to 1.55 while businesses using loans dropped
from  75% to 59%.  Below, Fig. XXXX lists some countries where this was noticed as
well. Croatia was a notable exception seeing steady improvements in its stock market
and loans, very similar to its neighbour Slovenia, yet its business owners in 2002 gave
loan access an obstacle rating of 1.38 and upped it to 1.78 and 1.58 in 2005 and 2009
respectively. Generally there was no trend apparent in shifts in rating data. As can be
seen below in Fig. 6. In Hungary, while loan access shrunk, did see a $15 billion rise in
its stock market capitalisation which might suggest a wealth of private equity was also
13 These are measured on a qualitative five-point scale from “no obstacle” to “very sever obstacle”. These were 
weighted from 0 to 4 points in order to calculate a weighted average with higher scores being a more important 
obstacle.
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available to fill the gap in the reduced loan market. 
When looking at the charts another trend is apparent, and very important. Loan
access  went  up  in  nearly  every  country  in  Eastern  Europe  where  the  banking
consolidation reforms discussed took place. Three exceptions exist: Poland, Hungary,
and Serbia. In all three there is a case to be made that equity finance grew sufficiently
to offset the unwillingness of banks to extend loans at reasonable terms to smaller
businesses. In Serbia, the number of publicly listed companies jumped from 99 to 1750.
While some countries, notably Romania, were forced to dramatically slash the number
of  listed  firms  as  part  of  a  reform  process,  the  Serbian  equity  market  growth
proceeded from a reform process  rather than preceding it,  implying more stability
Fig 6: Changes in loan access and perception of loan 
credit as an obstacle to business
All for 2002-2009 unless specified. Higher obstacles 
scores mean more of a perceived obstacle.
Country
Bulgaria (2002 – 2005) 11.4% -0.77
Bulgaria (2005 – 2009) -3.7% 0.06
Estonia 16.4% -0.32
Serbia 32.6% 0.19
Macedonia 28.4% 0.22
Slovakia 10.6% -0.38
Ukraine 6.4% 0.22
Armenia 11.0% 0.16
Czech republic 22.1% 1.08
Romania 7.7% -0.09
Kazakhstan 8.7% 0.52
Latvia 22.0% 0.48
Poland -4.2% -0.09
Hungary -1.9% -0.42
Chile (2006-2010) 25.2% 0.06
Montenegro -0.4% -0.14
Kyrgyz Republic -1.6% 0.34
Tajikistan -0.5% 0.01
Uzbekistan -0.5% 0.01
Change in loan 
access
Change in 
obstacle score
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than the large numbers  that  were  eventually  reduced in  some places.  Indeed,  the
number of unlisted firms in Serbia using equity finance grew from 6% in 2002, to 13%
in 2005 and 29% in 2009. In Slovenia where bank credit increased as mentioned, equity
usage growth was significantly more moderate, moving from 11% to 22% to 19% over
the same period.
The conclusion from this is that at the SME level, both loan and equity markets
can help firms grow. Limited to an analysis of unlisted firms within the the story of
Eastern European growth, it seems the traditional dichotomy of market or bank-led
growth holds true and that one or the other can suffice(Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic,
2002; Levine,  2002).  Overall  however,  it  seems that things have changed since this
allowed Germany and Japan to distinguish their development strategies from the US
and the UK. Instead, developing countries are having to provide both kinds of capital at
the  higher  end  of  the  spectrum.  Where  banking  reform  managed  to  achieve  this,
financing found its way to smaller businesses, usually via banks; occasionally via equity.
The Central Asian countries also studied (charts  in appendix) that did not go
through the same banking consolidation procedures – did not see significant increases
in loans to unlisted firms. The overall sentiment in those countries was also that access
to finance remains as strong of an obstacle  or has gotten worse.  The comparison is
valuable since both sets of countries gained independence from the Soviet Union at
the same time. While the economies of Eastern Europe would have had advantages in
their proximity to Europe and the geopolitical interests that Europe would have had in
seeing them develop, there is not bank-reform-led development and no improvement
in the situation of SMEs in Central Asia thus far (save in Kazakhstan's case).
Banking reform then seems, as predicted, to be a catalyst for pushing financing
towards unlisted firms – a desperate need in Ghana.  In Ghana's case,  this evidence
suggests its reform will  likely  need to produce bank financing  more specifically,  as
equity markets are thus far not as well developed. This implies taking lessons from the
Baltics and smaller Balkan states rather than Poland and Hungary. In short, Ghana's
policy  would  likely  need  to  be  aggressive  but  not  rely  on  new  foreign  entrants  –
although their presence would not be harmful and indeed many already are players on
the Ghana banking scene.
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7.1 Long term loans as a percent of all SME loans
In addition to simply having loans available to small businesses, the quality of
loans and the terms they are offered at is important. If collateral is too high the risk
outweighs the benefits and a company might prefer a slower path to speeding up its
investments but risking total bankruptcy, preventing it from getting future loans. This
is the limitation to innovation discussed in the theory portion of this paper. If interest
rates are too high they will make a firm illiquid, even if part of them can be reclaimed
from taxes. If loans are offered only on a short-term basis, it is difficult for managers
to plan long term and equally difficult to convince other investors that the company's
financing streams are secure enough to warrant further investment – the risk profile
of the company goes up dramatically. To try and look at this, a test was done of a very
limited data set produced by the OECD with information on the percentage of SME
loans that were short and long-term loans. This is useful as it helps to inform whether
the loans SMEs receive are at favourable terms. Since long-term financing is a problem
in Ghana the goal was to see if countries where more financing options were used by
firms pushed banks to offer better loan terms. The results are shown in Fig. 7 below.
Fig 7: Debt-equity ratio variance vs. Long-term SME loans
Pearson test: insignificant, P-value 0.56
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The correlation is insignificant  and mostly reliant on outliers, although it is in
the  expected  positive  direction.  Unfortunately  the  OECD  only  has  data  on  a  very
limited set of eighteen countries, and a measure for percentage of loans that are long
term for fourteen of them.  Performing this measure again with a wider set of data
would be desirable. 
Other  measures  were  then  sought  to  shed  light  on  loan  terms;  collateral
specifically. 15%  of  Ghanaian  firms  who  did  not  apply  for  a  loan  cited  exorbitant
collateral requirements as a deterrent. Thus this investigation is to see if that might be
improved by reforms aimed at diversifying firm-level finance in Ghana.
The first of the two again turned out to be lacking data.  The size of collateral
requirements was used – as a percentage of loan value and compared with debt-equity
variance, although there was no correlation. The issue stems largely from the fact that
the IFC has mixed methodologies for measuring this and aggregates these measures.
In  micro  data  form  no  consistent  set  of  countries  could  be  found,  while  the  IFC
website-generated data was unreliable. There was no data for this  from the EU or
OECD.
The third measure was a correlation measurement of how frequently collateral
is required for loans versus capital structure flexibility. The expectation was a negative
relationship suggesting that where firms can be more reactive in their capital structure
that banks will need to offer better terms. The sample used is included in annex and,
Instead of limiting to unlisted firms, IFC data from the year closest to 2010 was used
from that overall  survey.  The sample was limited by the same logic as in previous
calculations and aimed for wide coverage with an emphasis on developing countries.
64 | Gregory Gillette Global Political Economy
The results are encouraging; negative and valid at the 5% level for forty-three
countries  (Fig.  8).  For  interests' sake,  the  sample  was  reduced  to  isolate  only
developing  countries  (Eastern  Europe  included),  and  exclude  the extreme  outlier
datapoint for Ukraine. The plot for this second exercise was not included although the
validity of the correlation improved slightly to 0.038.
This last measure may be indicative that the previous two would follow suit
with a more ideal data set. It stands on its own however as further evidence for the
hypothesis that increasing firms' financing independence will  energise the economy
catalytically.  It  is  not  meant to  be a  causal  relationship  to  that  end,  but  rather  to
support  other findings that,  for example, firms had better credit after banking and
equity reforms in Eastern Europe, in creating a rough outline of what a policy roadmap
might look like in Ghana.  The political  limitations of  Ghana's  election cycle though
would  be  minimally  intrusive  into  an  economically-driven  development  plan  –
internationally  palatable  as  nothing  thus  far  suggests  the  need  for  protectionism.
Instead, industry should be pushed by the banking and finance sectors and this last
Fig 8: Collateral requirement and capital structure variance
Significant at 5%
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finding suggests that when that happens, firms will have an easer way forward. As firm
grow and perform, and banks are better placed to handle those that do not (perhaps
firm  failures  contributing  to  the  banking  consolidation  process),  some  banks  will
continue to accrues savings and investment capacity they will be able to recycle.
7.2 Capital structure variance & Access to loans
Theoretically,  where  firms  have  access  and  more  liberty  to  use  different
financing options, banks should be pushed to offer more loans overall to SMEs in order
to stay competitive – casting a wide investment net. A large capital base is necessary
to do so which is why this measure is especially important in justifying the need for
banking consolidation specifically  to facilitate firm-driven economic growth. This was
tested by calculating the overall  variance of the debt equity ratio of listed firms in
countries – a measure of capital structure variance (leverage). This was then compared
to the number of unlisted firms in a country with loan financing.  Essentially this is a
measure of the banking and finance sectors dynamism – and ability to accommodate
different firm dynamics.
In developed and developing countries, not all firms see themselves as needing
debt financing  it is important to point out.  Indeed, pecking order theory suggests it
should be one of the least preferred forms of financing, although it often provides tax
benefits  and allows for greater overall  investment on the part of firms than other
firms – national tax law-dependent. That said, according to Eurostat data, in the EU,
bank loans are by far the preferred form of financing for foreseeable future needs of
firms as it carries a regularity that cannot be guaranteed with internal revenue – which
is market dependent. For diverse reasons then, many firms either choose not to, feel
compelled not to, or are excluded from debt financing. In Ghana there is a desire for
further financing on ther part of business owners, industry analysts, and authors like
Abor, Akoto-Osei, and Osei who all feel the avilaibility of loans is currently insufficient.
According to WBES data, many countries have improved loan access over the
course of a development trajectory, although it is not a ubiquitous phenomenon. One
thing that is clear is that in Eastern Europe is that financing generally, improved, and as
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mentioned  this  usually  meant  loans,  with  a  few  exceptions.  Equity  could  require
further infrastructural  improvements and larger base of investors in Ghana making
debt finance the most feasible near terms solutions – one that likely would incensitive
further deepening of a non-public  equity  market.  To that end,  the most important
analysis in the relationship of capital structure variance to economies in this study is to
overall loan access. 
Fig.  9, shows  the  relationship  between  overall  unlisted  firm  access  to  debt
financing and capital structure variance. The list of  countries is included in appendix.
This was the strongest correlation of all variables tested. It also had good data both
from the ECB and the IFC although OECD data was could not be found aggregated for
specifically this measure.
The correlation is valid at the 1% level in the expected direction for a sample of
Fig 9: Debt-equity ratio variance among listed companies vs. loan access for 
unlisted companies for 40 countries
Significant at 1%
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forty countries suggesting a strong trend among non-specialised economies for capital
structure diversity to be a good proxy for various causal factors leading to increased
debt  financing  for  SMEs  and  unlised  firms.  This  is  the  strongest  evidence  found
supporting the theory that  Ghana will  need to push banks,  as  Kaldorian agents  of
savings allocation, to be more catalytic in their role in Ghana's macroeconomic growth.
This suggests that will happen with twofold diversity: banks' portfolios will be more
diverese; and overall  capital  structure will  be more diverse.  Ideally  this will  include
more companies getting funding to make IPOs and a better private equity market. 
Unlisted firms therefore  would  have a  good chance of  being more likely  to
access loan finance when they deem it necessary, in financial environments with more
capital structure flexibility overall – a form of financial depth. Importantly, loan terms
would be better as the market shifts from a “seller's” market (of debt) to a buyer's.
Ghana desperately needs this depth  and reform as entrepreneurs are stifled by an
economy that affords just one company in 614 access to equity financing and only
seventeen percent of SMEs access to loans – often with unfavourable terms. Banks it
seems are unable, rather than unwilling to change this, as sectoral watchers including
PwC admit this need as well. 
Addressing  this  problem  would provide  the  foundation,  theoretically for
further  contemporary  growth,  cognizant  of  international  political  and  economic
realities. Arguments  on  growing  Ghana's  economy  without  industrial  or  sectoral
pre-selection, but rather by instrumentalising competition in lieu of a government that
would not be able, for reasons that are also Ghana's political strengths, to play the role
that  developmental  governments  did  historically.  Importantly,  this  it  not  theory
entirely without precedent. The example set in Eastern Europe is one of governments
adapting to this role and it seems entirely plausible as the outcomes there matched
what others suggest is required in Ghana. This is in terms of greater financing options
for all firms and overall a more efficient and more rapidly growing financial sector to
drive other sectors forward such that the overall economy remains nimble, but stable.
Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, (2001) explain that many of the
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determinants of leverage and financial choices in developed countries are the same as
developing countries. The fact that the variables pushing these choices are the same
should  make  obvious  the  limitations  of  business  in  an  environment  where  those
choices  are  not  available.  In  a  globalised  world  of  capitalist  competition,  and  the
intense entrepreneurial incubation of a rapidly developing country, firms are proving
they want to set themselves apart but are limited financially in their abilities to do so.
Meanwhile  Beck  et  al.,  (2008a) added to a  body of  work  on  the triggers  of  firms'
financial preference for diversion by focusing on smaller firms in developing countries,
benefiting most from relative environmental advantages in legal protections as exist
in  Ghana  –  then  from  financial  accommodation.  This  highlights  the  relevancy  of
pushing Ghana's banks to deliver better financing terms down the chain of firm sizes. It
also sheds light on the importance of giving the independence to firms as they grow to
adapt to different financing styles.  In their paper they touch on development-bank
loans and supplier credit for medium and larger firms. The greater presence of these in
healthier business climates corroborates what was found here regarding the trend of
greater general flexibility at the higher ends of the scale facilitating firm development
at  the  lower  end.  This  builds  the  conditions  necessary  for  an  overall  nation-level
investment  in  growth  built  on  the  capacity  for  diversity,  without  necessarily
committing  resources  too  thinly  at  that  national  level  through  policy,  but  rather
through a rationalised banking sector and invigorated business sector.
Chapter VIII -  Conclusion  & Policy  
Ghana's Ricardian collective action problem has manageable solutions.  Firms,
particularly  SMEs  in  Ghana struggle  to  obtain  financing  on  terms  capable  of  truly
allowing  a  multi-industry  push  for  innovation  and  competition-driven  capitalist
creative destruction.  The fulcrum of Ghana's problem lies at the composition of its
banking sector where banks fail to innovate within their sector as much as they fail to
seek and support innovation in other sectors. The incumbent banks are spreading a
thin  consumer  savings  base  too  thinly  to  meaningfully  build  properly  hedged  and
capitalised  portfolios  that  involver  higher  risk  –  but  systemically  necessary  –
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investments in up-and-coming firms and sectors.  Historical  precedent suggests that
consolidating the sector stands a good chance of solving this  issues,  backed up by
original  quantitative  inquiries  done  here.  Not  only  does  the  combination  of  case
inquiry  and statistical  data used in this  study suggest  that more firms would have
access to finance, but that they would have access to it with better collateral terms, for
longer  periods  of  time,  and  would  have  other  options  open  up  in  due  time to
compliment debt financing as well.
Directing credit towards SMEs is not a developing world only phenomenon in
recent years it  seems as well.  The OECD this  year highlighted many measures that
helped developed countries direct credit towards startups in an effort to recover more
quickly from the global financial crisis (OECD, 2013). Many developed countries in need
of growth see up-and-comers as the source of continued economic success the same
way  the  developed world  needs  the  dividends of  continuous economic  renewal  to
build its economies  into modern capital managing entities capable of delivering the
social dividends citizens there want to see. Many government policies implemented in
the  OECD  could  have  good  benefits  in  Ghana  such  as  subsidising  interest   rates,
guaranteeing loans and venture capital, tax exemptions perhaps for companies that
formalise  after  operating  on  Ghana's  stamp  tax  informally  and  like  Ireland  and
Denmark,  or setting  bank  targets  for  SME  lending  with  preferential  central  bank
interest  rates  for  commercial  banks  that  meet  targets.  Nonetheless  these  are  not
without  problems.  The  last  sounds  attractive  but  could  prove  to  be  a  perverse
incentive  if  companies  find  it  more  profitable  to  achieve  better  interest  rates  for
themselves  and  not  spend  on  monitoring  investments.  For  that  reason  the  best
solutions is to first create a better banking and finance environment for SMEs before
brining on board more minute measures. 
Ghana's growth will likely lie in diversification, especially to hedge against the
threats commonly associated with oil-driven growth.  A dynamic banking sector will
fuel continuous exploration of new industrial venues  that a cursory look at Ghana's
stock market earlier revealed are surprisingly diverse already. The result will surely be
some businesses failing as per a normal export diversification curve, but ultimately it
will mean strong domestic outlets for an improving human capital input.  This paper
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has  shows  why  this  theoretically  and  historically  has  provided  knowledge  and
infrastructure dividends, better governance,  and in some cases and likely in Ghana's,
important regional leadership. It also will give Ghana a more favourable relationship to
international financial flows and would attract increased volumes of FDI.
The  role  of  banks  in  the  economy  is  to  help  allocate  capital  through
investments that mobilise savings. This is as true now as it has been since Schumpeter
made that same observation  over 100 years ago. The reason for this is to invest in
firms that can drive up productivity  by themselves investing in new technologies.  In
Ghana, the latter mechanism does not function because the former does not. Banks
are neglecting the responsibility of their economic agency and thus firms are not able
to perform their role in turn despite an expressed desire to through the WBESs. There
is sufficient capital but overall economic organisation is left to banks. Ghanaian banks
have sufficient technology and infrastructure and thus the issue lies at the sectoral
level.  Empirically  the  necessity  to  have  change  in  the  sector  is  demonstrated  by
evidence suggesting that  when firms have more capacity within an economy to vary
their capital structure – the source of their strategy investments – more firms in turn
are  able  to  do  so.  Thus,  a  multiplier effect  can  take  hold  allowing  innovation  to
perpetuate. Going to  the sectoral  root  of  this  problem,  that  is  where government
intervention must strike.
Luckily there is  a precedent in recent history for  reinvigorating the banking
sector  to  fuel  business-led  innovation.  Unlike  with  the  developers  of  the  early
twentieth  century,  the  government  in  Ghana  will  not  need  to  bear  the  brunt  of
investment, allocation, or even opportunity identification itself. That will be delegated
to banks. Instead, the government needs simply to increase competitiveness in the
sector. The sector is currently uncompetitive because no bank is can rationally justify
braking rank. If there is a real threat of acquisition however, those rational actions will
change and banks will invest or have their portfolios bought out by the banks that are
leading.  Banks  only  lead  if  their  portfolios  perform  and  that  only  happens  if  the
companies  they  invest  in  prosper.  Banks  need  to  have  a  wide  portfolio  of  safe
investments  offsetting  higher-risk  SME  investments  and  also  have  the  capacity  to
provide monitoring if not formal consulting services to the companies their portfolios
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depend on. 
The  goal  of  this  paper  was  to  make  the  case  for  the  goals  of  reform  and
reinforce  the  case  for  the  need  for  banking  sectoral  reform  in  Ghana.  Through
quantitative  evidence  this  was  accomplished  by  showing  a  significant  correlation
between  capital  structure  variance  and  loan  access  for  unlisted  firms  worldwide.
Qualitative evidence was used to provide the best practises from the most comparable
and recent country-level cases that have suffered and overcome similar problems. The
exact  policy  changes  in  Ghana  now  would  have  to  be  left  to  a  more
domestically-oriented  study  and  the  government's  own  policy  preferences  as  no
reform  is  likely  to  happen  in  the  near-term  without  their  action  –  barring  other
exogenous impacts. 
Essentially this amounts to giving more economic agency to firms and less to
banks  who  will  be  forced  to  operate  more  like  the  firms  they  lend  to  –  seeking
innovation in order to remain competitive. If the banking sector is not developing it
will cause an investment bottleneck that will cut off the flow to businesses seeking to
invest in tangible innovation. The political economy solution is to have political bodies
in Ghana understand  that their further national and social development depends on
economic  reforms that  must  have a  political  impetus.  Small  policy  changes,  either
through  national  government  ownership  shares  in  leading  banks,  raising  capital
minimums, implementing SME investment minimums or a combination of the above
and other creative measures.  If Ghana takes steps to incentivise consolidation in the
banking sector,  this evidence suggests they will  be more effective institutionally at
both sides of their role – generating profit, and allocating capital.
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Appendix I -  capital purchase  s   with debt   vs. Stock market 
capitalisation  (and number of listed firms)  
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Country Survey year
Armenia 2002 161 5.85%
Armenia 2005 198 34.76%
Armenia 2009 12 16.81%
Bulgaria 2002 354 11.98%
Bulgaria 2005 331 23.38%
Bulgaria 2009 398 19.64%
Chile 2006 244 1.64%
Chile 2010 227 26.82%
Croatia 2002 66 25.73%
Croatia 2005 145 28.25%
Croatia 2009 271 30.53%
Czech 2002 78 19.40%
Czech 2005 36 11.37%
Czech 2009 16 26.40%
Estonia 2002 31 15.98%
Estonia 2005 35 17.81%
Estonia 2009 48 32.38%
Hungary 2002 48 23.67%
Hungary 2005 44 22.20%
Hungary 2009 43 21.80%
Kazakhstan 2002 49 8.00%
Kazakhstan 2005 62 15.46%
Kazakhstan 2009 69 16.67%
Kyrgyz 2002 22 7.51%
Kyrgyz 2005 8 8.04%
Kyrgyz 2009 8 5.92%
Latvia 2002 62 12.50%
Latvia 2005 45 15.27%
Latvia 2009 33 34.46%
Macedonia 2002 78 5.36%
Macedonia 2005 57 8.76%
Macedonia 2009 36 33.72%
Montenegro 2002 10 40.00%
Montenegro 2005 19 27.78%
Montenegro 2009 28 39.64%
Poland 2002 216 22.17%
Poland 2005 248 20.47%
Poland 2009 354 17.99%
Romania 2002 4870 16.47%
Romania 2005 3747 22.84%
Romania 2009 1824 24.16%
Serbia 2002 99 9.91%
Serbia 2005 864 15.88%
Serbia 2009 1750 32.57%
Slovakia 2002 354 10.64%
Slovakia 2005 209 11.82%
Slovakia 2009 107 21.21%
Slovenia 2002 35 24.59%
Slovenia 2005 116 28.90%
Slovenia 2009 76 46.67%
Ukraine 2002 184 7.36%
Ukraine 2005 221 16.04%
Ukraine 2009 145 13.81%
Uzbekistan 2002 6 3.09%
Uzbekistan 2005 114 3.40%
Uzbekistan 2009 355 2.55%
Number of 
listed Firms
% unlisted that used loan 
finance for assets in 
preceding year
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Appendix  II   – Firms - % Loans requiring collateral vs. Capital  
Structure Variance
Country
Bolivia 91.5 0.225
Botswana 64.7 0.151
Brazil 31.6 0.712
Bulgaria 83.4 0.836
Chile 51.1 0.783
Colombia 30.5 0.557
Croatia 85.4 0.571
Ecuador 80.6 0.287
Egypt 74.3 0.154
Estonia 71.6 0.294
Hungary 84.4 0.342
Kazakhstan 94.4 0.633
Kenya 86.1 0.155
Latvia 75.2 0.327
Lebanon 67.8 0.088
Lithuania 83.4 0.436
Macedonia 84.6 0.417
Malawi 88.1 0.004
Mexico 67 0.874
Nigeria 78.8 0.481
Peru 47.7 0.502
Poland 62.5 0.737
Romania 75.5 0.332
Serbia 60.8 0.805
Slovakia 77.5 0.365
Slovenia 55 0.436
Thailand 89.4 0.489
Venezuela 81.8 0.256
Zimbabwe 81.4 0.407
Indonesia 51.5 0.524
Malaysia 97.7 0.219
Philippines 97.8 0.300
Vietnam 89.4 0.620
Canada 66.7 0.605
Italy 53 1.412
Netherlands 45 0.626
UK 45 0.767
Czech Republic 73.2 0.051
Germany 90.9 0.698
Greece 57.8 0.776
Spain 68.3 1.346
Ukraine 86.8 1.306
% of Loans 
requiring 
collateral
Debt-equity 
ratio variance
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Appendix  III   – Firms - % unlisted firms with financing vs. Capital  
Structure Variance
Country
Argentina 57.50% 0.574
Austria 84.60% 0.912
Belgium 88.40% 0.578
Bolivia 55.80% 0.225
Botswana 52.10% 0.151
Brazil 65.10% 0.712
Bulgaria 45.00% 0.836
Chile 76.60% 0.783
Colombia 52.10% 0.557
Côte d'Ivoire 10.90% 0.354
Croatia 68.40% 0.571
Czech 76.70% 0.051
Germany 83.30% 0.698
Ecuador 61.60% 0.287
Estonia 57.60% 0.294
Finland 78.40% 0.621
France 94.70% 0.539
Greece 78.00% 0.776
Ireland 90.30% 3.011
Italy 89.60% 1.587
Kazakhstan 39.60% 0.633
Macedonia 58.40% 0.417
Mexico 47.50% 0.874
Nigeria 13.90% 0.481
Netherlands 93.00% 0.613
Peru 22.30% 0.502
Portugal 84.80% 2.371
Romania 53.50% 0.332
Serbia 68.40% 0.805
Slovakia 47.40% 0.365
Slovenia 45.70% 0.436
Thailand 72.50% 0.489
Ukraine 32.10% 1.306
Uruguay 51.50% 0.325
Venezuela 38.60% 0.256
Lithuania 53.00% 0.436
Malawi 40.10% 0.004
Poland 50.10% 0.737
Spain 89.57% 1.346
Zimbabwe 12.50% 0.407
% Unlisted 
firms with 
loan 
financing
Debt-equity 
variance
